While morality leads us to faith in God as one who can
assist us in our moral striving, Kant insists that we
should not factor God into our practical reason. Kant says
that there opens up before us an “abyss of a mystery
regarding what God may do, whether anything at all is to be
attributed to him and what this something might be in
However, there is no mystery about what
morality requires of us and so, returning to our duty to
form an ethical community, we are still bound to labor for
the establishment of an ethical community as though it were
in our power.
Since we are not permitted to rely actively upon God,
Kant’s invocation of God amounts to a bare acknowledgement
of God. This minimal acknowledgement of God is also
evident in Kant’s definition of religion as the recognition
of all our duties as divine commands.
In so defining
religion Kant says that he avoids some errors that are
often made regarding the concept of a religion in general.
This definition requires no assertoric knowledge, not even
of God’s existence, and thereby does not overreach the
limits of our theoretical insight by feigning knowledge of
53
Religion, AK 6:137-9; pp. 140-1.
54
Religion, AK 6:100-101; p. 111.
55
Religion, AK 6:153-4; p. 153.
19
Convention