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On Ibn Khaldun's Theory of Political Decline and Its Implications for Western Concepts of Democracy
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people, it naturally causes them to follow the ways of sedentary culture and adopt its customs. […] When elegance in (domestic) economy has reached the limit, it is followed by subservience to desire. From all these customs, the human soul receives a multiple coloring that undermines its religion and worldly (well-being). (It cannot preserve) its religion, because it has now been firmly colored by customs (of luxury), and it is difficult to discard such coloring. (It cannot preserve) its worldly (well-being), because the customs (of luxury) demand a great many things and (entail) many requirements for which (a man’s) income is not sufficient.
48
What Ibn Khaldūn describes here is a result of civilization beyond its peak. His
description is comparable to the Greeks’ understanding of pleonexia (πλεονεξια). If one follows Ibn Khaldūn’s outline of the increasing need of tax revenue, further aspects of his economic theory become obvious. First of all, Ibn Khaldūn states that the ruler’s only possibility to improve his financial resources is through tax revenue. One reason for this is grounded in the ruler’s and the dynasty’s ban to engage in farming or other commercial activities. What does Ibn Khaldūn exclude the ruler and the dynasty from agricultural and commercial activities? If one summarizes, the ruler has to act as a neutral part in the economy. His main task is to provide all necessary prevailing conditions and to act as purchaser of goods. That means, he has to put the money – or at least parts of it – back to the market, in particular by demanding cultural goods – and he is not allowed simply to fill his treasury. If he is doing this properly, then, the “dynasty and government serves as the world’s greatest market place, providing the substance of civilization.”
49
Leaving aside the prevailing conditions, Ibn Khaldūn presents himself as an advocate of a
liberalized market objecting to all further economic engagement of the ruler or of members of the royal family. If the ruler would engage in economics and agriculture – the “heavy industries” of the 14
th
century –, he would endanger the stability of the free market system. Ibn Khaldūn
exemplifies his fear by referring to a ruler, who owns a farm to increase his treasury. According to Ibn Khaldūn, the ruler would expect from all merchants to buy his products to the highest possible prize. Under such conditions, the ruler furthermore expects a prize that in far above the regular market prize. Moreover, he assumes to have the possibility to buy products for the lowest possible prize, even to a prize below the lowest market prize. Finally, since his main business is government and not commerce, the ruler is not able to wait for a boom. He would presumably force merchants to sell his products for him, and he will be only satisfied with the highest possible prize.
50
For Ibn Khaldūn the consequence of this kind of a ruler’s economic activity is
obvious: Merchants become useless, since they are not enabled to trade any longer. The merchants lose the opportunity to earn something and make for a living. They are forced to sell their goods at the lowest price. If they have to do this repeatedly, they exhaust their capital and have to go out of business. But this, however, does not only affect individual traders, it also causes the destruction of civilization that is usually followed by the destruction of the dynasty: “When the subjects can no longer make capital larger through agriculture and commerce, it will decrease and disappear as a result of expenditures. This will ruin their situation.”
51
Ibn Khaldūn assumes the necessity of gradually increasing tax revenue and therefore he
expects permanently increasing taxes for every individual. He also assumes that the possible tax rate reaches sometime a limit leading to the destruction of the commonwealth. If the ruler furthermore lays hand on the subjects’ property, if through a tax overload or directly, a sudden disintegration and the decay and destruction of the dynasty will be the consequence. This development is to be expected even quicker than through the natural decline of the dynasty.
52
This, however, brings another of the ruler’s dilemmas to light. Leaving aside failures in
economic policy, the revenue of taxation depends on the cultural activity of the dynasty,
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8
people, it naturally causes them to follow the ways of sedentary culture and adopt its
customs. […] When elegance in (domestic) economy has reached the limit, it is followed
by subservience to desire. From all these customs, the human soul receives a multiple
coloring that undermines its religion and worldly (well-being). (It cannot preserve) its
religion, because it has now been firmly colored by customs (of luxury), and it is difficult
to discard such coloring. (It cannot preserve) its worldly (well-being), because the
customs (of luxury) demand a great many things and (entail) many requirements for
which (a man’s) income is not sufficient.
48
What Ibn Khaldūn describes here is a result of civilization beyond its peak. His
description is comparable to the Greeks’ understanding of pleonexia (πλεονεξια). If one follows
Ibn Khaldūn’s outline of the increasing need of tax revenue, further aspects of his economic
theory become obvious. First of all, Ibn Khaldūn states that the ruler’s only possibility to improve
his financial resources is through tax revenue. One reason for this is grounded in the ruler’s and
the dynasty’s ban to engage in farming or other commercial activities. What does Ibn Khaldūn
exclude the ruler and the dynasty from agricultural and commercial activities? If one summarizes,
the ruler has to act as a neutral part in the economy. His main task is to provide all necessary
prevailing conditions and to act as purchaser of goods. That means, he has to put the money – or
at least parts of it – back to the market, in particular by demanding cultural goods – and he is not
allowed simply to fill his treasury. If he is doing this properly, then, the “dynasty and government
serves as the world’s greatest market place, providing the substance of civilization.”
49
Leaving aside the prevailing conditions, Ibn Khaldūn presents himself as an advocate of a
liberalized market objecting to all further economic engagement of the ruler or of members of the
royal family. If the ruler would engage in economics and agriculture – the “heavy industries” of
the 14
th
century –, he would endanger the stability of the free market system. Ibn Khaldūn
exemplifies his fear by referring to a ruler, who owns a farm to increase his treasury. According
to Ibn Khaldūn, the ruler would expect from all merchants to buy his products to the highest
possible prize. Under such conditions, the ruler furthermore expects a prize that in far above the
regular market prize. Moreover, he assumes to have the possibility to buy products for the lowest
possible prize, even to a prize below the lowest market prize. Finally, since his main business is
government and not commerce, the ruler is not able to wait for a boom. He would presumably
force merchants to sell his products for him, and he will be only satisfied with the highest
possible prize.
50
For Ibn Khaldūn the consequence of this kind of a ruler’s economic activity is
obvious: Merchants become useless, since they are not enabled to trade any longer. The
merchants lose the opportunity to earn something and make for a living. They are forced to sell
their goods at the lowest price. If they have to do this repeatedly, they exhaust their capital and
have to go out of business. But this, however, does not only affect individual traders, it also
causes the destruction of civilization that is usually followed by the destruction of the dynasty:
“When the subjects can no longer make capital larger through agriculture and commerce, it will
decrease and disappear as a result of expenditures. This will ruin their situation.”
51
Ibn Khaldūn assumes the necessity of gradually increasing tax revenue and therefore he
expects permanently increasing taxes for every individual. He also assumes that the possible tax
rate reaches sometime a limit leading to the destruction of the commonwealth. If the ruler
furthermore lays hand on the subjects’ property, if through a tax overload or directly, a sudden
disintegration and the decay and destruction of the dynasty will be the consequence. This
development is to be expected even quicker than through the natural decline of the dynasty.
52
This, however, brings another of the ruler’s dilemmas to light. Leaving aside failures in
economic policy, the revenue of taxation depends on the cultural activity of the dynasty,
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