group of settlers to increase its own population base in a way that would have not been possible
otherwise (or at least as easy). This may lead to an increase in world population, so that the
injustice endogenously creates the very circumstances for the possibility of supersession. In this
case, the danger of a moral hazard is not avoided.
If one denies land claims by declaring 1) "this particular historical injustice is
superseded" and 2) there is no moral hazard in doing so, then one needs to also claim 3)
circumstances would have inevitably changed to justify sharing the land. The problem is: how
can we ever know if and when 3) is true? We do not know that a change in world population
would have occurred in a counterfactual world in which the injustice had not occurred. We
certainly do not know that, simply because the population increased in our world.
simply the point that all the difficulties about counterfactuals, mentioned by Waldron elsewhere,
When Waldron says "there is no moral hazard in this supersession", he can only be
talking about supersessions where the change in circumstances was inevitable. That is, when in
the present we make the determination of supersession, how do we know if in this case
"aboriginal inhabitants would have had to share their lands, whether the original injustice had
taken place or not." Looking back on what might have been, we cannot say that we know this
must have occurred. And if we do not know in any particular instance, in what situation can we
ever say "there is no moral hazard in this supersession"? Surely Waldron would not want to rely
on the problematic use of counterfactuals to show these circumstances were likely.
Consider the situation from the point of view of the actor before she commits an
injustice. As I mentioned earlier, Waldron sees (along with Kant) the stain of injustice that occurs
with forced settlement. In response to this issue, Waldron says, “As far as I can see, what Kant
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Waldron might respond that population increases are part of the circumstances of cosmopolitan right. I am skeptical
about the role these assumptions can play here. Significant interaction between population groups might be 'more or
less' inevitable, as Waldron seems to say, but that statement is not quite the same as saying that it is inevitable.
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See “Superseding Historic Injustice.” The problems of counterfactuals would seem to apply. I do not mean merely
that the Nazis could have taken over in an alternate universe. I mean that if we try to deny the danger of a moral hazard
this way, we are claiming more than a possibility of population increase. Possibility is not probability. If my car is
stolen and the thief is caught driving it a month later, some possibilities are irrelevant to whether I should get the car
back. It is irrelevant that it is possible that I might have lost the car the next day through a bet, or that the car might
have been stolen by a different thief. It still should be presumed that I get the car back.
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Convention