Over the past fifteen years, cultural issues have claimed an increasing share of the policy agenda
in Washington and many state capitals. Casual observation suggests that issues such as abortion,
gay rights and gun control are almost obsessively covered in American newspapers, radio
programs and television news. In addition, legislators and other political elites are increasingly
polarized on cultural policy issues across party lines: Democratic elites are increasingly pro-
choice, pro-gay rights and in favor of gun control, while Republican elites increasingly take
stronger positions against each of these (Adams 1997; Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002;
Fiorina 2005). These observations lead many to conclude that a “culture war” has erupted in
American politics: that cultural policy issues not only dominate the policy agenda and divide
political elites, but also reflect significant differences in opinion in the electorate.
But what remains unclear is whether the mass public is in fact strongly divided on cultural policy
issues. White (2003) argues that increasing heterogeneity in ethnicity and family structure in the
United States has created heterogeneity in policy preferences on cultural issues. The result at the
elite level is increasing cultural policy conflict. Fiorina (2005), however, demonstrates that
public opinion on cultural policy issues tends to be far more moderate and less polarized than is
suggested by media accounts of a culture war.
The question of whether and how the mass public is divided on cultural policy issues is
significant for political scientists for both normative and positive reasons. The normative
question at stake is whether a policy agenda and media focus dominated by cultural issues serves
the interests of the electorate. If little mass conflict exists on these issues, then it is likely the
electorate would be better served by more attention on issues of higher salience and higher mass
conflict. The positive question at hand concerns the make-up of the political parties at the mass
2