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Paradoxes of Constitutional Democracy
Unformatted Document Text:  Paradoxes of Constitutional Democracy Kevin Olson Department of Political Science 3151 Social Science Plaza University of California Irvine CA 92697-5100 ## email not listed ## 949-824-8335 Prepared for delivery at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, 2005 © American Political Science Association keywords: constitutional democracy, democratic theory, legitimacy, JürgenHabermas, Frank Michelman abstract: Drawing on the work of Frank Michelman and Jürgen Habermas, Ioutline two interconnected paradoxes of constitutional democracy. The paradox ofthe founding shows that a purely democratic constitution can never be founded,because the procedures needed to secure its legitimacy cannot be spontaneouslyself-generated. It displays an infinite regression of procedures presupposingprocedures. The paradox of the Nth amendment heads off any attempt to resolvethis problem through constitutional amendment. It shows that a developingconstitution needs some standard to guide it towards legitimacy. Without such astandard, constitutional reform is aimlessly indeterminate. I outline a solution tothese paradoxes based on the ideas of dynamic constitutionalism and reflexivecitizenship. It shows how a dynamically evolving constitution can promote itsown legitimacy from within, resolving both paradoxes in one stroke.

Authors: Olson, Kevin.
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Paradoxes of Constitutional Democracy
Kevin Olson
Department of Political Science
3151 Social Science Plaza
University of California
Irvine CA 92697-5100
## email not listed ##
949-824-8335
Prepared for delivery at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, September 1-4, 2005
© American Political Science Association
keywords: constitutional democracy, democratic theory, legitimacy, Jürgen
Habermas, Frank Michelman
abstract: Drawing on the work of Frank Michelman and Jürgen Habermas, I
outline two interconnected paradoxes of constitutional democracy. The paradox of
the founding
shows that a purely democratic constitution can never be founded,
because the procedures needed to secure its legitimacy cannot be spontaneously
self-generated. It displays an infinite regression of procedures presupposing
procedures. The paradox of the Nth amendment heads off any attempt to resolve
this problem through constitutional amendment. It shows that a developing
constitution needs some standard to guide it towards legitimacy. Without such a
standard, constitutional reform is aimlessly indeterminate. I outline a solution to
these paradoxes based on the ideas of dynamic constitutionalism and reflexive
citizenship
. It shows how a dynamically evolving constitution can promote its
own legitimacy from within, resolving both paradoxes in one stroke.


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