(Page 19 of 25) - Racism, Difference, and the Problematic Politics of Social Solidarity authored by Schwartz, Joseph.

at extending full citizenship beyond the province of the well-to-do were founded upon the patriarchal
assumptions of a male, bread-winning, head-of-household. This male head-of-household’s ability to
participate fully both in the formal work force and the public sphere rested upon women serving as the
nurturers of the family and the private realm. And the republican depiction of the citizen-bearing-arms
and defending their right to self-government also took on a male character, given gendered assumptions
about virility and military service. The absence of public, equitably-financed child care, combined with
the tieing of most public pension-benefits to the earnings history of the male spouse, denies American
women the opportunity to combine formal labor-market participation with child-rearing in a manner that
does not limit life-opportunities.

Thus, social solidarity -- the achievement of equality of social

membership through public recognition of communal, mutual obligations -- has only been partially
instantiated, in a strikingly gendered-manner, in even the advanced democratic welfare states.

But does this mean that all attempts at achieving an equality of citizenship which would allow

for the flourishing of diverse individuals and sub-cultures need be patriarchal or exclusionary? (e.g.,
sexist, racist, homophobic)? Does a feminist commitment to the particular needs of women necessitate
an abandonment of a commitment to universal social equality? Or can equality consist of treating people
with equal respect by granting people with differential needs the appropriate public resources to address
such needs?

Contemporary feminist theory and practice has focused upon the tension between

universal and particular conceptions of identity within the practice of justice. Influenced by the work of
Carole Gilligan on adolescent moral development, feminist theorists frequently contend that the "male
voice's" focus upon impartial, universal laws of justice ignores the contextualized, particular bonds of
attachment thbat often inform moral deliberation.

While the popularization of Gilligan's work in a postmodern direction has led to denunciations of

impartial, Kantian, "logocentric," male reason, she herself cautions that the ability to hear both voices
are crucial to the nuanced and contextual nature of moral deliberation. Gilligan's argument implies that
proper moral development involves the acquisition of both voices and the knowledge of how to best
combine the two voices depending upon circumstances.

For example, we cannot fairly contend that

our friend should not be held to the speed limit because they may experience some minor financial
hardship in paying the fine; but we might properly contextualize -- and defend -- their violation of the
speed limit if they were rushing their injured child to the hospital.

How to employ universal principles of justice to the contextualized position of individual cases is

endemic to the adjudication of specific moral dilemmas. In rendering these specific judgments, a
democratic community would adapt generalizable principles to specific circumstances. But both the
general principle and how we apply it to the specific context must be defended by reasons that a
majority find just (and the reason for applying the principle in the particular case itself involves an
appeal to a generalizable principle, as invariably the defender of the judgment would claim that in a
similar context a just person would decide the case in the same way). As with other false antinomies
driving contemporary moral and political theory (e.g., community versus individuality; universality
versus particularity), asserting a rigid dichotomy between generalizable principles and contextualized
judgments violates the actual nature of our deliberative practices. That is, generalizable moral and legal

On this point, see Nancy Fraser, "Women, Welfare, and the Politics of

Need Interpretation," in Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and
Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1989), pp. 113-143.

An ambitious attempt in democratic and constitutional theory to deal

with these questions is Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion,
Exclusion, American Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

See Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1982), esp. p. 166.