2
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the formulation of a coherent normative theory governing
the use of military force by liberal states is the lack of a well-defined model that describes
with sufficient accuracy the nature of the international system.
1
Neither of the simple
models to which theorists have historically been drawn can be accepted. The first views
the relations among states as ideally mirroring the relationship among citizens in a
substantially just liberal state (let us call this the legalist’s model); the second views the
relations among states ideally as an amoral anarchy, as described in Hobbes’s portrait of
the state of nature (let us call this the realist’s model). Although both models have a
certain measure of plausibility, their ultimate inadequacy is in fact well understood. The
pre-eminent contemporary just war theorist, Michael Walzer explicitly recognizes the
limitations of the two simple views, but, we argue, his normative prescriptions do not
entirely escape the pull of the simple models; this dependence, we suggest, generates
problematic consequences for the coherence of his normative prescriptions. After
demonstrating the difficulties Walzer’s excessive dependence on the legalist’s model of
international society generates, we propose an alternative normative conception of
international society based on a Rousseauian ideal model of the international system.
I. Two Simple Models of International Society
Before examining Walzer’s view more fully, it will be helpful to explore in more
detail the two simple models of the international system introduced above. Both of the
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On the lack of coherence in just war theories, see, e.g., Michael Walzer, “A Reply,”
Ethics and International Affairs vol. 11 (1997): 99-104, 100. (“I don’t believe that the
issues I addressed, the issues that have to be addressed [in “the theory of the just war”],
can all be brought neatly under the cover of a single rational and coherent doctrine.”)
Convention