must know is whether the present social assumptions about when obligations exist are
in fact correct. To return to the example of caring for an aging parent, in order to
determine whether children are in fact obligated (or indeed, whether they are in a “special
position” to respond to the needs of the parent), we would need to interrogate present
familial, friendship, and employment practices. For it might be that current familial
practices place undue burdens on some members (say, women), or that the assumption
that children are obligated to care for their aged parents has more to do with absurdly
sentimentalized conceptions of family life than genuine reflection on how care should be
provided. In any case, for this investigation some sort of impartial perspective is
indispensable, both to gain critical distance from current conceptions, and to determine
whether present practices pay due respect to the individual. Given the problems we
found above with the concept of empathy, this due respect is best understood in terms of
whether individuals in an impartial choice situation would choose principles that are
compatible with our present practices.
(c) There is a similar problem at work with regard to what needs and
vulnerabilities can legitimately obligate one to provide care for another. Kittay
acknowledges that sometimes needs have been constructed falsely, or in such a way that
the needs in question can only be fulfilled by diminishing the parties involved. For
instance, a heroin addict “needs” the drug, but fulfilling that need might diminish the
addict. Similarly, an able-bodied person who has always had servants or slaves meet all
her needs might be vulnerable if those servants no longer performed their work.
However, we probably want to say that this person’s “need” for slaves and servants is
false since it diminishes her care providers and makes her unnecessarily dependent on
others. Legitimate responsiveness to needs therefore requires more than just fulfilling the
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Convention