Something similar holds for the exercise of public autonomy. For many, this will
entail things like voting, attending political meetings, or writing blogs. For some
disabled, however, it will simply be the process by which they communicate to make
their needs known, often to those who know them intimately. Thus, one’s capability set
defines the meaning of public and private autonomy. If so, then paying due respect for
persons requires a commitment to expand the capability sets of all. Furthermore, because
the expansion of capabilities often requires care practices, the idea of due respect for
persons requires a commitment to respect and support for such practices. The right to be
cared for is therefore equally basic to the rights guaranteeing public and private
autonomy. Put differently, Habermas’s categories of rights—i.e., the rights guaranteeing
public and private autonomy, along with the rights to social welfare—all reciprocally
explain one another. It is only through discursive practices that guarantee public and
private autonomy that citizens can legitimately identify and expand one another’s
capabilities; yet it is only by paying attention to or expanding diverse human capabilities
that we can define the meaning of public and private autonomy. This co-equality means
that, in their status as legal citizens, people must grant one another not just rights that
guarantee public and private autonomy, but also the right to the supports necessary to
expand their capability sets. Each citizen, no matter how ill or disabled, can claim
therefore a right to be cared for so that they can develop their capabilities.
This approach productively integrates Kittay’s insights about the centrality of
dependency and care into Habermas’s framework of impartial decision-making. In
adopting Sen’s capability approach, we can recognize the diversity of human capabilities
and yet still insist on a kind of equal treatment: all citizens have the right to those
supports necessary to expand their capability sets. We can understand Kittay’s
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