Capability, Freedom and Democracy
August 24, 2005
Abstract
As a strategy for addressing the pressing issue of absolute deprivation and as a critique of
alternative informational frameworks of justice, Amartya Sen’s capability approach has come
to enjoy an independent existence in the lexicon of distributive justice. Rather than specifying
capabilities in terms of human flourishing, Sen focuses on the freedom of a society to
prioritize its valuable capabilities and functionings, recognizing the crucial role that
democratic public reasoning plays in human well-being in terms of the opportunities it
provides for open public discussion and scrutiny as well as in the formation of values.
Although Sen follows Rawls in much of his emphasis on the role of public reasoning, there
are important differences between their conceptions of the limits and content of public
reasoning and in their understanding of political objectivity. This paper draws on the
implications of these differences for some of the tensions between democracy and justice and
suggests that the substantially broader conceptions that supplement the capability approach
give us good reasons to ground the demands of justice in democratic procedures.
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Introduction
In thinking about the question raised by this panel “How Capable is the Capabilities
Approach?,” I do not know that I can answer it without asking: how capable at what? The
Paper presented to ‘How Capable is the Capabilities Approach?’ Panel, American Political Science Association
Annual Conference, Washington, D.C., Sunday 8:00 am, September 4, 2005.
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Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, ## email not listed ##