Kelts, 19
assumption, A is the authority on her own interests and rights, B on his, and all of their fellow
citizens on their own. If this is the case, majority rule isn’t a proper way to adjudicate justice
disputes: it’s a practical way to bring them to some sort of conclusion that approximates the just.
But it leaves in its wake a great deal of potential injustice.
What if we lift the assumption of privileged access, as Mill himself seems to do with
respect to justice? Consider especially a case in which A proposes some legislation built on a
moral value which she claims is fit to govern society because it is just. In the case of such moral
legislation, the application of a principle of justice would do one of two things: first, it might
take account of the rights-interests of all members, and weigh these against each other (in a case
where B’s proposed right to live by his own moral code butts up against A’s rights); or, second,
it might weigh the rights-interests of B against the public justification of the law (security,
offensiveness, public decency, or whatever) built on some interests of the public at large (of
which A is a part).
Only if A and B have access to some sort of information about each other’s overall
justice interests (which may be different than the interests which spawn their personal moral
views) can B legitimately be restricted according to A’s proposal (perhaps even have this
publicly-accepted value inculcated in him in some way). If both A and B are doing their best to
think about the proper mix of interests of themselves and others
(which Mill certainly implies is
their duty, and a skill he values highly) then B’s dissent may indicate that he is in fact mistaken
about justice: the majority decision takes account of his interests in a manner different than he
does, but it is not ignorant of his interests. If he believes that the balance tips more in his favor
than do the other members of his society, there is no reason to claim that he is necessarily right
while they are necessarily wrong.
23
To paraphrase the quote from Rousseau in the epigraph, what they are being asked is not
exactly whether they approve the proposal or reject it, but whether it does or does not conform to
justice.
Convention