(Page 2 of 20) - In Defense of Moral Legislation authored by Kelts, Steven.

Kelts, 2

“When a law is proposed in the People’s assembly, what they are being asked is
not exactly whether they approve the proposal or reject it, but whether it does or
does not conform to the general will, which is theirs; everyone states his opinion
about this by casting his ballot, and the tally of the votes yields the declaration of
the general will. Therefore when the opinion contrary to my own prevails, it
proves nothing more than that I made a mistake and that what I took to be the
general will was not.” (Rousseau, On the Social Contract

, Book 4, Ch. 2)

“On questions of social morality, of duty to others, the opinion of the public, that
is, of an overruling majority, though often wrong, is likely to be still oftener right,
because on such questions they are only required to judge of their own interests,
of the manner in which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be practiced, would
affect themselves. But the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as a law on the
minority, on questions of self-regarding conduct is quite as likely to be wrong as
right….” (Mill, On Liberty

, p.102)

Mill is not Rousseau: of that we can be sure. Mill goes to great lengths at the beginning

of On Liberty to show just that.

What, then, are we to make of the surprising similarities in the

statements above? At least when it comes to questions of social morality, Mill seems willing to

turn rights over to democratic control. This becomes all the more puzzling when we see that on

matters of justice – which, I will argue, is the prime example of a Millian social value – Mill

says, “To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others develops the feelings and

capacities which have the good of others for their object.” (pp.76-77) Not only would Mill

submit questions of social morality to democratic determination; he would seem to allow values

chosen in this way to be inculcated in individuals.

This runs against everything we thought we knew about Mill – his opposition to moral

legislation, and his support for complete freedom of belief for individuals. But I will argue that

this common reading of Mill is incomplete – his real task in On Liberty is not to argue for

unfettered individual freedom, but to delicately separate the domain of personal control

Rousseau, On the Social Contract, trans. Victor Gourevitch, Cambridge Press, p.124.

Mill, On Liberty, ed. Currin V. Shields, Prentice Hall, p.102.

See OL pp.5-7; and my somewhat better supported comments below, pp.5-7.

Being trained in such values may, indeed, be part of his very definition of individuality, as we

will see below, p.16.