ity, perfectionism, intuitionism, and his two principles. In the pages below, I develop an analo-
gous method of reflective equilibrium that is appropriate for democratic theory. Its aim is to ad-
judicate between contesting conceptions of democracy and to stimulate the development of more
satisfying conceptions. The next section offers a formal and abstract ideal reflective equilibrium
process for democratic theory. Sections III and IV construct the two menus of alternatives on
which reflective equilibrium in democratic theory works: conceptions of democracy and institu-
tional configurations. Finally, sections V and VI apply the reflective equilibrium approach to two
important and common kinds of political problems: determining the rules of the game and ad-
dressing minority tyranny and capture.
II. An Ideal Process of Reflective Equilibrium in Democratic Theory
Rawls’ reflective equilibrium attempts to reconcile gaps between general principles of
justice and considered judgments about particular actions, institutions, or broad standards.
4
Scan-
lon describes the method this way:
the method of reflective equilibrium proceeds in three stages. One begins by identifying a
set of considered judgments about justice. These are judgments that seem clearly to be
correct under conditions conducive to making good judgments of the relevant kind; that
is, when one is fully informed about the matter in question, thinking carefully and clearly
about it, and not subject to conflicts of interest or other factors that are likely to distort
one’s judgment. The second stage is to try to formulate principles that would “account
for” these judgments... Since one’s first attempt to come up with such principles is un-
likely to be successful, there is a third stage in which one decides how to respond to the
Reflective Equilibrium in Democratic Theory — Draft Only!
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Rawls 1971, 1975; Scanlon 2002; Daniels 2003.
Convention