divergence between these principles and one’s considered judgments. Should one give up
the judgments that the principles fail to account for, or modify the principles, in order to
achieve a better fit? It is likely that some accommodation of both of these kinds may be
required. One is then to continue in this way, working back and forth between principles
and judgments, until one reaches a set of principles and a set of judgments between which
there is no conflict.
5
There are many ways that processes of reflective equilibrium might be adapted to theories
of democracy. I focus here upon the fit between general ideas of democracy on one hand and the
forms of decision-making and action that seem, upon reflection, to be appropriate to particular
circumstances on the other. An ideal process of reflection—unbounded by time and ener-
gy—might proceed this way.
1. Begin with the full range of contextualized problems and issues that require public de-
cision and action. Call this set P = {p
1
, p
2
, ...., p
n
}.
2. Construct a full menu of feasible alternative institutional arrangements for making
those decisions and taking action. These institutional arrangements might range from em-
powering a Platonic guardian to settling matters through the direct deliberations of the
entire polity. Call this menu I = {i
1
, i
2
, ...., i
n
}.
3. For every p
i
P, develop a considered judgment regarding the most desirable institu-
tional arrangement i
pi
I for that problem and context. To identify i
pi
, we conduct a pair-
wise comparison of all of the possibilities contained in, or elements of, I and assess their
Reflective Equilibrium in Democratic Theory — Draft Only!
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5
Scanlan, Ibid. p. 140-1.
Convention