eration, common decision, and common action for the policies that determine their common
lives.”
13
This is why Rousseau thought that “the moment a people allows itself to be represented,
it is no longer free.”
14
IV. Institutional Alternatives: The Democracy Cube
While these developments in democratic theory provide several distinct and well-
articulated conceptions of democracy, there is no similar body of work that structures institu-
tional alternatives. Two polar alternatives of direct participation and electoral representation con-
sume almost the entire cramped debate regarding the appropriate institutional forms of demo-
cratic governance. I proceed here by offering a much richer institutional menu, drawing upon
strands of contemporary scholarship and practical innovation, that is more fruitful than the di-
chotomy between representation and direct participation. The purpose of this device is to organ-
ize the process of reflection about what sorts of arrangements are desirable and appropriate for
making public decisions and taking public action for various problems and contexts. The device
therefore focuses upon three dimensions of institutional designs for collective decisions: Who
participates? How do they communicate and make decisions? What is the connection between
their conclusions and opinions on one hand and public policy and action on the other? Putting
these three dimensions together yields a space, or a “democracy cube,” of institutional alterna-
tives. Consider the possibilities along each of these dimensions in turn.
Reflective Equilibrium in Democratic Theory — Draft Only!
Page 9
13
Barber, p. 146-7.
14
See Social Contact, Book III, Chapter 15. Also: “Every law the people has not ratified in person is null and void --
is, in fact, not a law. The people of England regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only during the
election of members of parliament. As soon as they are elected, slavery overtakes it.”
Convention