In our postmodern situation, the philosophy of Jurgen Habermas provides a link
back to a more modern view of democracy. Within his discourse ethics, Habermas gives
reason a central role in maintaining an inclusive, deliberative framework. Of course, the
view of reason we find in Habermas is modest compared to truly modern variants.
Instead, Habermas characterizes the product of reasonable deliberation as, “an
overgeneralization of the special case of the validity of moral judgments and norms.”
This position, as his translator points out, reflects Habermas’s attempt to bridge the
transcendental philosophical tradition of the continent and Anglo-American pragmatism.
Hence, truth is reasonably shown if all will agree to it under the conditions of the ideal
speech situation.
Obviously, many political theorists argue that Habermas intends his ideal speech
situation to be just that, an ideal. We can never expect to reach it fully, but we should
structure our practices so that we approximate this ideal as closely as possible. However,
I think that even this modest goal is not accessible in the real world of politics. It is
impossible to generate the institutional infrastructure needed to maintain or approximate
the ideal speech situation from within the praxis of discourse ethics. Instead, the rules for
an ideal speech situation are dependent upon an outside source of authority. If my
observation is correct, then the use of Habermas’ theory to political thinking, even as a
possible theory of legitimating democratic deliberation is seriously limited.
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Convention