stress equally the importance of democracy – of aconstitutionalism
and democratic agency (and not just as a nutritional source, but also as
a dangerous supplement) – to constitutionalism.
Honig criticises the relative weight given by Habermas to the two principles of
constitutionalism and democracy, but the appeal to ‘the right balance’ between the
two principles implies a mediating ground between them, and she suggests that we
think of the relationship in terms of a spectrum of more or less: ‘Talk of a
contradiction between constitutionalism and democracy, per se, prevents us from
developing nuanced analyses of varying situations. Thinking in terms of a
constitutional/democracy spectrum rather than in terms of an abstract binary might
broaden our vision’.
The problem is that the different ways of understanding the relationship
between constitutionalism and democracy that Honig mentions (and some of which
she endorses) all leave intact the concepts of constitutionalism and democracy and
presuppose that they are constituted within an objective space: a contradiction
presupposes that the two poles of the contradiction are fully constituted; a spectrum
and a balance presuppose a mediating third to which both principles can be referred;
and so on. In each case, the objectification – and, ultimately, the potential
reconciliation at a higher level – of the relation between constitutionalism and
democracy is still possible. Honig rightly criticises Habermas for his attempt to
reconcile constitutionalism and democracy within a spatial conception of history.
However, she substitutes the balancing of constitutionalism and democracy for their
reconciliation. The attempt to balance is itself spatial because it presupposes a third
mediating point from which to balance constitutionalism and democracy, for instance
a complete description of the relevant context.
The relationship between constitutionalism and democracy is undecidable.
There is a constitutive gap between constitutionalism and democracy, a slight but
infinite distance that cannot be objectified, and, as a result, the two cannot be
reconciled. But one must also avoid the opposite conclusion – equally spatialising –
that constitutionalism and democracy can be kept apart or opposed. Their
35
Ibid., 800.
36
Ibid., 801.
37
Ibid., 799.
38
Compare CD 801. In Derrida’s words, there is a ‘structural nonsaturation’ of the context, cf. Derrida,
Margins of Philosophy, p. 310. Hence, constitutionalism and democracy are articulated anew in each
context, but the contingency of this articulation cannot be dissolved in an objectification of the context.
19
Convention