1
Cohen (1998), cited in Saward (2000c) p. 67.
2
Saward (2000c) 72, responding to Michelman (1997).
3
Cohen (1989) 23 in Saward (2000c) p. 67.
4
See Riker (1982) or Arrow (1963) as discussed in Miller (2003).
5
Miller (2003) 186.
6
We are not arguing against democracy itself but instead critiquing the contemporary theorizing of it. As Budge (1996)
notes, arguments for less democracy can become an argument against democracy altogether. That, as Saward points out, is a
problem with Schumpeter’s prescription and we hope not to fall into that trap. Saward (2000c) pp. 75-77 and Schumpeter
(1976).
7
8
Calabresi in Ackerman (2002) p. 129.
9
Calabresi p. 142.
10
Dahl (1956) p. 3.
11
Dahl (1998) p. 86.
12
Dahl (1989) pp. 193-209. As Dahl writes, political autonomy is not an absolute right. Not all “persons” are automatically
citizens either.
13
Dahl (1956) p. 36.
14
Dahl (1956) p. 47.
15
See Putnam (1993) or Inglehart (1990) and (1997) for other instances providing some recognition of this problem. But
questions of socialization or citizenship only approach the problem of how political values are communicated and
transmitted. It does not tackle the question of how election rules are democratically chosen.
16
Dahl (1998) pp. 27-28.
17
Dahl (1956) pp. 50-51, 63-64, 131.
18
Dahl (1989) p. 179.
19
Dahl (1989) p. 179-180.
20
Saward (2000c) p. 67.
21
Przeworski (1998), cited in Saward (2000c) p. 67.
22
Saward (2000c) p. 77.
23
Saward (2000b) p. 5 and Budge (2000).
24
Miller (2003).
25
“The move from imaginary thought experiments to real (or at least possible) institutions, or the move from deliberations
behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ to those in a ‘face to face society’ confronts us with precisely such questions. Instead of
deliberations behind a veil, we are to envisage real people under realistic conditions making actual policy choices.” Fishkin
and Laslett (2003b) p. 2.
26
Saward (2000c) and Dryzek (2000).
27
Saward (2000b) p. 4.
28
The role of elites becomes critical here. See Bang and Dyrberg (2000).
29
“Deliberative democracy, broadly defined, is …any one of a family of views according to which the public deliberation
of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate political decision making and self-government.” Bohman (1998) p. 401 in
Saward (2000b) p. 6.
30
Rattila (2000) pp. 43-52.
31
Saward (2000c) p. 75.
32
Fishkin and Luskin (2000), Smith (2000), and Eriksen (2000).
33
Saward (2000c) pp. 70-75.
34
“I simply cannot conceive of constructing an analysis of any issue in contemporary political theory around the affirmation
or negation of anything which Locke says about political matters.” Dunn (1969) x.
35
In fact, in the article he denounces his earlier across-the-board denial of any contemporary relevance for Locke, calling it
an “expression of stupidity” reflecting “intellectual myopia.” Dunn (1990) 9.
36
Dunn (1990) p. 21.
37
Shaftsbury had learned from his network of contacts and spies that in 1670, Charles had secretly signed a treaty with
France promising that he would eventually, when the time was right, openly convert to Catholicism and return England to
the ecclesiastical control of the Catholic Church. The supposed right time for this conversion never came; Charles was only
seeking to gain French assistance against the Dutch in a war over trade, and does not appear ever to have made any move
toward fulfilling his promise. But Shaftsbury and his allies did not have the benefit of hindsight and had no way to know
what Charles’s real intentions were. See Ashcraft (1986) 17-20 and 115-116; and Marshall (1994) 357.
38
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rotten_borough and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Old_Sarum; retrieved August 22, 2005.
39
Madison (1961) p. 349.
Convention