Author's Keywords: Delegation, Informational Lobbying, Asymmetric Information, Sender-Receiver game	Convention Submission, Review, and Scheduling! All Academic Convention can help with all of your abstract management needs and many more. Contact us today for a quote! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40014_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Feldmann, Sven. "Learning from Interested Parties" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2011-03-14 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40014_index.html>

Feldmann, S. , 2005-09-01 "Learning from Interested Parties" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-14 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40014_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Decision-makers often rely on external sources for their information such as consultants, real estate agents, or ``helpful sales agents. In politics, decision makers often rely in information from interest groups. This paper analyzes how much the decision-maker can learn from such interested parties---informants who themselves have a stake in the decision to be made. I show that the information provider has an incentive and the ability to withhold some information if he is not known to be fully informed. Since the decision-maker learns about some states of the world but never about others, learning from interested information providers is asymmetric. Applying the results to the problem of delegation, I show that it a legislature can elicit more information from interest groups when it delegates the decision to a bureaucrat while constraining the bureaucrat's discretion. The paper thus extends the theory of delegation by endogenizing bureaucratic expertise, recognizing that the latter is, at least in part, the result of voluntary information revelation by interest groups.

Unequal Latin American Democracies: The Influence of Interest Groups in Legislatures� Policy Choices

When Does Interest Group Policy Information Matter? A Dynamic Study of New Technology Interest Groups? Use of Information in Congressional Hearings