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Learning from Interested Parties
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References
[1] Bawn, K. (1995), “Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about
Administrative Procedures”, American Political Science Review, 89(1), 62–73.
[2] Bendor, J. and Meirowitz, A. (forthcoming). “Spatial Models of Delegation.” American
Political Science Review.
[3] Bennedsen, M. and Feldmann, S. (2002a), “Lobbying Legislatures,” Journal of Political
Economy, 110(4), 919–48.
[4] Bennedsen, Morten, and Sven E. Feldmann (2005), “Informational Lobbying and Po-
litical Contributions.” Working paper, Northwestern Univerisity.
[5] Dewatripont, M. and Tirole, J. (1999), “Advocates,” Journal of Political Economy,
107(1), 1–39.
[6] Epstein, D. and O’Halloran, S. (1999) Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics
Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
[7] Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole (1991), “The Politics of Government Decision-
Making:
A Theory of Regulatory Capture”, Quarterly Journal of Economics
106(4):1089–127.
[8] Milgrom, Paul (1981), “Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and
Applications”, Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2):380–91.
[9] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1986), “Relying on the Information of Interested Parties,”
Rand Journal of Economics, 17(1), 18–32.
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References
[1] Bawn, K. (1995), “Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about
Administrative Procedures”, American Political Science Review, 89(1), 62–73.
[2] Bendor, J. and Meirowitz, A. (forthcoming). “Spatial Models of Delegation.” American
Political Science Review.
[3] Bennedsen, M. and Feldmann, S. (2002a), “Lobbying Legislatures,” Journal of Political
Economy, 110(4), 919–48.
[4] Bennedsen, Morten, and Sven E. Feldmann (2005), “Informational Lobbying and Po-
litical Contributions.” Working paper, Northwestern Univerisity.
[5] Dewatripont, M. and Tirole, J. (1999), “Advocates,” Journal of Political Economy,
107(1), 1–39.
[6] Epstein, D. and O’Halloran, S. (1999) Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics
Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
[7] Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole (1991), “The Politics of Government Decision-
Making:
A Theory of Regulatory Capture”, Quarterly Journal of Economics
106(4):1089–127.
[8] Milgrom, Paul (1981), “Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and
Applications”, Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2):380–91.
[9] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1986), “Relying on the Information of Interested Parties,”
Rand Journal of Economics, 17(1), 18–32.
21
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