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INTRODUCTION
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1989; Gelman and King 1990); redistricting and incumbent protection (Cox
and Katz 2002; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2005); and the use of redistricting
to lock one party in power (Cain and Butler 1991; Issacharoff 2002; Persily
2003). For racial redistricting, studies have examined the impact of redis-
tricting on black office-holding in the South (Davidson and Grofman 1994),
the tradeoff between redistricting for descriptive vs. substantive representa-
tion (Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran 1996; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999;
Lublin 1999), and the the role of redistricting in the Republican takeover of
Congress (Lublin and Voss 2000).
Most of these studies have been empirical, while the theoretical literature
on the topic has been fairly sparse. This is beginning to change, though: re-
cent work by Coate and Knight (2005) analyze a model of partisan redistrict-
ing with partisans and independents and calculate the districting schemes
that maximize overall social utility. And Shotts (2001) presents a model of
racial redistricting with partisan control of the redistricting process. He finds
that majority-minority district requirements have no effect on liberal gerry-
manderers, whereas they can limit the options of conservative districters.
We also study the problem of racial redistricting, asking a question sim-
ilar to that of Coate and Knight (2005): If one were to redistrict with the
object of protecting minority interests, what schemes would be most appro-
priate under a given set of circumstances? Under what circumstances would
it be better concentrate minority voters in relatively few districts, and when
should they be dispersed across districts? Under what conditions does a
tradeoff exist between descriptive representation—electing minority candi-
dates to office—and substantive representation—passing policies supported
by the minority community? And how do answers to these theoretical issues
help us understand the changes that have taken place in Southern politics
since the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA)?
These questions have been brought into sharp relief by the recent Supreme
Court ruling in Georgia v. Ashcroft.
The question before the Court was
whether a proposed redistricting scheme violated Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act just because it “unpacked” minority voters, spreading them out
more evenly across districts. The Court ruled that state legislators were
attempting to increase blacks’ overall influence on policy, and so the scheme
was overall not “retrogressive” even though it might result in fewer minority
representatives elected to office.
This paper therefore presents a formal model of policy outcomes in which
a political minority has relatively extreme ideological preferences. In the
analysis, a districting scheme is implemented which divides minority voters
across districts. Candidates from majority and minority groups then present
themselves for election in each district, offering platforms designed to max-
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539 U.S. 461 (2003).
Convention