All Academic, Inc. Research Logo

Info/CitationFAQResearchAll Academic Inc.
Document

A Bias toward Loss Aversion in the Choice to Enter Risky Cooperative Games
Unformatted Document Text:  1 A bias toward loss aversion in the choice to enter risky cooperative games While much research has addressed decision-making within prisoner’s dilemma games, relatively little has examined the risky decision to enter such games in the first place. Furthermore, few studies involving experimental games have considered salient ecological factors—such as the manner in which game payoffs are framed—that influence human psychology. We ask whether the choice between entering v. not entering a PD game is more accurately described by standard utility theory or the utility function proposed by prospect theory, which emphasizes gains and losses relative to the status quo. Subjects chose between a fixed “no play” option and the uncertainty of entering a PD when payoffs were framed variously as involving losses and involving gains. Although payoffs were equivalent across the two frames, we show, consistent with prospect theory, that subjects entered PD play more frequently when options were framed as losses than when they were framed as gains. These results solicit researchers studying game behaviour to consider not only the internal, cognitive aspects involved in decision making, but also the environmental features—e.g., game structure and frames— that influence choice behaviour. Laboratory research investigating choice behaviour in the prisoner’s dilemma was originally focused on testing the prediction that rational people will choose the dominant defect alternative, absent “extra-PD” incentives supporting cooperation. Findings are, by now, unambiguous and well accepted: People often do cooperate in such PD games (Camerer & Hogarth, 2003; Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1989; Dawes & Thaler, 1988; Ledyard, 1995), choosing against their private interest and, thereby, producing greater social welfare.

Authors: Johnson, Tim., Myagkov, Mikhail. and Orbell, John.
first   previous   Page 1 of 16   next   last



background image
1
A bias toward loss aversion in the choice to enter risky
cooperative games
While much research has addressed decision-making within prisoner’s dilemma
games, relatively little has examined the risky decision to enter such games in the
first place. Furthermore, few studies involving experimental games have
considered salient ecological factors—such as the manner in which game payoffs
are framed—that influence human psychology. We ask whether the choice
between entering v. not entering a PD game is more accurately described by
standard utility theory or the utility function proposed by prospect theory, which
emphasizes gains and losses relative to the status quo. Subjects chose between a
fixed “no play” option and the uncertainty of entering a PD when payoffs were
framed variously as involving losses and involving gains. Although payoffs were
equivalent across the two frames, we show, consistent with prospect theory, that
subjects entered PD play more frequently when options were framed as losses than
when they were framed as gains. These results solicit researchers studying game
behaviour to consider not only the internal, cognitive aspects involved in decision
making, but also the environmental features—e.g., game structure and frames—
that influence choice behaviour.
Laboratory research investigating choice behaviour in the prisoner’s dilemma
was originally focused on testing the prediction that rational people will choose the
dominant defect alternative, absent “extra-PD” incentives supporting cooperation.
Findings are, by now, unambiguous and well accepted: People often do cooperate in
such PD games (Camerer & Hogarth, 2003; Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt,
1989; Dawes & Thaler, 1988; Ledyard, 1995), choosing against their private interest
and, thereby, producing greater social welfare.


Convention
Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events!
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.
Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!
Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!
Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

first   previous   Page 1 of 16   next   last

©2008 All Academic, Inc.