While the 9/11 attacks may have caused some Americans to be more interested in foreign policy
issues, a debate began to rage over the legitimacy of preemptive military action, preventive war, and
American hegemony. Although public support for offensive force peaked in May 2003 at 67%,
ideological and partisan views on this subject solidified. Conservative Republicans were more supportive
of preemption and preventive force, while liberal Democrats and independents became become more
skeptical. Consequently, the divide between Democrats and Republicans over this issue, which was
already sizable in May 2003 (19 points), ballooned to 44 points by August 2004. The red-state, blue-state
divide was bleeding into foreign policy realm with Bush and Kerry voters perceiving America’s role in
the world in starkly differently terms (Pew Research Center 2004).
Any astute observer of American politics is well aware of the fact that the 2004 election was not
unique in history. A cursory analysis of poll data demonstrates that foreign policy and international
issues dominated presidential elections between 1948 and 1972. Between 1976 and 2000, economic
issues were seen as most important problem with the 1992 election being the most centered on the
economic prosperity and stability (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 2004; Pew Research Center
2004). This leads us to pose the following question: was a new foreign policy consensus emerging
among both elites and the public? Was the rise of selective engagement with the collapse of the Cold
War evolving into a widely held faith in unilateralism concerning the role of the US in international
affairs following the 9/11 terrorist attacks? Could it be that the trend toward increased diversity in foreign
policy orientations was coming to an end?
An important consideration in helping to frame tentative answers to these questions is
understanding the beliefs of elites or America’s opinion leaders. The growing complexity and uncertainty
of global problems has “led policy makers to turn to new and different channels of advice” (Haas 1992:
12) and specifically to “networks of knowledge-based experts” (Hall 1989) in the academy, think tanks,
and other repositories of technical and scholarly expertise. The goal of elite experts has been to articulate
the objective causes of international problems, the “real” stakes or interests of states affected by those
problems, and appropriate policy solutions remedies (Nelkin, 1979). In particular, Haas (1992: 2-3, 17)
has argued that “epistemic community members’ professional training, prestige, and reputation for
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Convention