and then complete elimination of nuclear weapons and are firmly against a new stage of the arms
race and against its transfer to outer space."
The U.S. plans for the development of SDI created problems for Gorbachev's foreign
policy position. Gorbachev's alarm at Reagan's policies was not founded on the fear that SDI was
actually possible, for as in the United States, many Soviet scientists and leaders did not believe
that Reagan's dream would succeed. The problem lay in the fact that research on SDI could create
technological breakthroughs that would place the Soviet Union at a military disadvantage.
Gorbachev did not want SDI to lead to an even more expensive and dangerous phase of the arms
race. He believed that this would only serve to heighten tensions between the two superpowers,
reduce Soviet advantages, further erode the Soviet economy, and be counterproductive.
Thus, heading into Reykjavik in October 1986, both Reagan and Gorbachev had strong
views of the international environment and of each other. Both leaders had a set of goals they
desired and needed to pursue. Both possessed an overarching belief that the world would be
better off without nuclear weapons, but they had divergent ideas on how to obtain this goal.
Gorbachev's Operational Code
The three philosophical issues discussed for Reagan will also be applied to Gorbachev.
First, Gorbachev's fundamental view of politics and his image of the opponent appear to have
played a major role in his negotiating stance at Reykjavik. Gorbachev did not believe that the
United States was an implacable enemy and he did not view international relations as a "zero-sum
game." He considered the intense competition and conflict that this type of thinking created
unnecessary and unproductive. He wanted to pursue peaceful coexistence with the West and a
reduction in tension between the two superpowers.
Following from this is the second philosophical issue relating to the prospects for
80
"Excerpts From Gorbachev Speech on the Reykjavik Talks and 'Star Wars,'" The New York Times October 23,
1986: A12.
81
Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 226-227.