October 22, 1986 Gorbachev stated, "With all responsibility as a participant in the talks, I state:
The President did, albeit without special enthusiasm, consent to the elimination of all - I
emphasize - all, not only certain individual, strategic offensive arms, to be destroyed precisely
over ten years."
Beyond the confusion over the specifics of the discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Casper
Weinberger, Congress, and allied members of NATO were upset that they had not been consulted
before such far-reaching proposals were discussed. The military implications of a substantial
change in deterrence strategy, the loss of strategic modernization, and the loss of the American
nuclear umbrella over Western Europe were all areas of concern. At a meeting of NATO defense
ministers in late October 1986, it was made clear that the U.S. allies were not willing to give up
nuclear weapons as the centerpiece of NATO defense. Although American leaders have viewed
nuclear weapons as a burden, European allies viewed them as vital to preventing a Soviet military
move against Western Europe.
Coordinative Behavior and Matching
What occurred in the face-to-face meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev on the issue
of nuclear weapons appears to support Dean Pruitt's theories of coordinative behavior and
matching. As previously stated, coordinative behavior occurs when the bargainer pursues a
mutually acceptable solution through collaboration with the other party. Both Reagan and
Gorbachev desired the elimination of all nuclear weapons, fulfilling Priutt's first criteria for
engaging in coordinative behavior, that the bargainer must have the goal of achieving
coordination, and they chose to take steps toward that end. In addition, both sides made
concessions (with Gorbachev conceding far more than Reagan) which Pruitt states can create
trust, which is his second criteria for engaging in coordinative behavior.
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"Gorbachev Angrily Accuses U.S. of Distorting the Iceland Results," The New York Times October 23, 1986:
A12.
Convention