 |
Unstable Politics: Fiscal Space and Electoral Volatility in the Indian States
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
Electoral Volatility in the Indian States
Changes in Mobilization
The first serious comparative analysis of electoral volatility was conducted by Przeworski (1975),who sought to respond to Huntington’s (1968) provocative claim that developing societies mightbe destabilized by the rapid increase in social mobilization resulting from concurrent economic andpolitical reform. Huntington’s fear was that the rapid influx of new participants into the politicalarena would overwhelm fledgling democracies whose political institutions were insufficiently devel-oped to absorb and process the increased levels of political participation. Przeworski tested thisinsight against data for electoral volatility in European societies to see if increases in mobiliza-tion resulting from widening enfranchisement as well as the creation of mass parties that soughtto mobilize new voters increased volatility in the electoral arena, which he likened to ’decay’ or’deinstitutionalization’ of the party system.
A similar argument was advanced by Sjoblum (1983), who theorized that increasing social and
spatial mobility of voters resulting from economic development in industrial societies should leadto higher levels of electoral volatility. As voters became more mobile, their political preferencesregarding government policy were likely to be come more fluid. Moreover, the growth of the publicsector and the increasing complexity of the economy made government economic policy less certain,which Sjoblum argued would lead voters to be available to alternative appeals.
Bartolini and Mair summarize these arguments succinctly:
Increases in turnout should therefore create a new active electorate which is relativelymore susceptible to the impact of short-term factors. Subject to different forces andto different influences, the balance among the new voters is unlikely to be identical tothat of existing voters. This, combined with the impact of those new voters who havebeen mobilized by special issues, suggests that the newly enlarged electorate is likelyto reflect a partisan balance which differs from that at the previous election, and this,in turn, should be reflected in a relatively high level of volatility. (1990: 174)
To summarize, the effect of mobilization on electoral volatility is posited to occur via the intro-duction of new voters with different preferences than the older voters.
7
In India, Yadav (2000)
argues that a second democratic upsurge occurred in the 1990s with the mobilization of hithertounmobilized voters especially among the poor and the disadvantaged. We could therefore expectgreater electoral volatility in Indian elections after the 1990s than earlier.
Social Cleavages
Tied intimately to the mobilization argument is an emphasis on the role social cleavages play in thepolitical arena, and therefore in determining electoral volatility. This set of arguments draws itsinspiration in a well-established literature that finds the roots of modern party systems in historicalsocial cleavages (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967 for the seminal statement of this claim). The Lipset-Rokkan thesis was that modern European party systems were stable because they reflected ’frozen’
7
Tests of the mobilization hypothesis have been limited by lack of accurate data over-time cross-nationally.
Przeworski used historical data from nine European states and Canada and finds that “institutionalizationwas lowest [i.e., electoral volatility was highest] during the period between the wars” (1975: 51) and that“newly mobilized voters [were] not any less socialized than [were] previous participants” (1975: 58). Furtheranalysis revealed that the argument had more empirical support in some countries than others, and that theeffects of mobilization and demobilization were distinct. Bartolini and Mair (1990: 175-176) find evidence ofa threshold effect for turnout, such that changes in turnout above 4%, were correlated with higher volatility.Further, they echo Przeworski’s claim that mobilization and demobilization are distinct, and argue thatthere’s a “skewed parabolic effect” of turnout on volatility.
9
|
| | Authors: Nooruddin, Irfan. |
|
| |
|
|
Electoral Volatility in the Indian States
Changes in Mobilization
The first serious comparative analysis of electoral volatility was conducted by Przeworski (1975),
who sought to respond to Huntington’s (1968) provocative claim that developing societies might
be destabilized by the rapid increase in social mobilization resulting from concurrent economic and
political reform. Huntington’s fear was that the rapid influx of new participants into the political
arena would overwhelm fledgling democracies whose political institutions were insufficiently devel-
oped to absorb and process the increased levels of political participation. Przeworski tested this
insight against data for electoral volatility in European societies to see if increases in mobiliza-
tion resulting from widening enfranchisement as well as the creation of mass parties that sought
to mobilize new voters increased volatility in the electoral arena, which he likened to ’decay’ or
’deinstitutionalization’ of the party system.
A similar argument was advanced by Sjoblum (1983), who theorized that increasing social and
spatial mobility of voters resulting from economic development in industrial societies should lead
to higher levels of electoral volatility. As voters became more mobile, their political preferences
regarding government policy were likely to be come more fluid. Moreover, the growth of the public
sector and the increasing complexity of the economy made government economic policy less certain,
which Sjoblum argued would lead voters to be available to alternative appeals.
Bartolini and Mair summarize these arguments succinctly:
Increases in turnout should therefore create a new active electorate which is relatively
more susceptible to the impact of short-term factors. Subject to different forces and
to different influences, the balance among the new voters is unlikely to be identical to
that of existing voters. This, combined with the impact of those new voters who have
been mobilized by special issues, suggests that the newly enlarged electorate is likely
to reflect a partisan balance which differs from that at the previous election, and this,
in turn, should be reflected in a relatively high level of volatility. (1990: 174)
To summarize, the effect of mobilization on electoral volatility is posited to occur via the intro-
duction of new voters with different preferences than the older voters.
In India, Yadav (2000)
argues that a second democratic upsurge occurred in the 1990s with the mobilization of hitherto
unmobilized voters especially among the poor and the disadvantaged. We could therefore expect
greater electoral volatility in Indian elections after the 1990s than earlier.
Social Cleavages
Tied intimately to the mobilization argument is an emphasis on the role social cleavages play in the
political arena, and therefore in determining electoral volatility. This set of arguments draws its
inspiration in a well-established literature that finds the roots of modern party systems in historical
social cleavages (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967 for the seminal statement of this claim). The Lipset-
Rokkan thesis was that modern European party systems were stable because they reflected ’frozen’
7
Tests of the mobilization hypothesis have been limited by lack of accurate data over-time cross-nationally.
Przeworski used historical data from nine European states and Canada and finds that “institutionalization
was lowest [i.e., electoral volatility was highest] during the period between the wars” (1975: 51) and that
“newly mobilized voters [were] not any less socialized than [were] previous participants” (1975: 58). Further
analysis revealed that the argument had more empirical support in some countries than others, and that the
effects of mobilization and demobilization were distinct. Bartolini and Mair (1990: 175-176) find evidence of
a threshold effect for turnout, such that changes in turnout above 4%, were correlated with higher volatility.
Further, they echo Przeworski’s claim that mobilization and demobilization are distinct, and argue that
there’s a “skewed parabolic effect” of turnout on volatility.
9
|
|
 Convention | | All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
