indicated that the divisions between Republicans and Democrats appeared to have deepened and
become more widespread since 2000, the rough parity between the parties had clearly given way
to a small but decisive Republican edge. The conventional wisdom after the election claimed that
moral values, especially as they applied to the gay marriage controversy, tipped the election to
Bush and the Republican Party. Clearly, cultural values played an important part in the election.
But close analysis reveals that the war on terrorism made more of a difference. The Rasmussen
Poll, which proved to be the most accurate survey throughout the election season, showed that
the most important issue to voters was “national security,” not “cultural” values.
In the end 51%
of the voters said they trusted Bush more than Kerry to handle the War on Terror – not
surprisingly, Bush received 51% of the popular vote (Rasmussen 2004, see also Freedman 2004)
.
In truth, Bush’s foreign policy played a critical part in confirming social conservatives’
support for Bush and the Republican Party. As Peterson (2004:252) argues, “the administration
and social conservatives have been particularly unified when working in concert on foreign
policy issues, including blocking funding for international family-planning programs and
supporting the hard-line stance of Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon.” A Pew report (Green
2004:34) also demonstrates that evangelicals have responded enthusiastically to the president’s
doctrine of preemptive war, with more than 70 percent of evangelicals supporting preemption
(compared with 40 percent of atheists and agnostics). Evangelicals clearly perceive that they are
playing a much more important role in the formulation of policy under the Bush administration.
According to Reverand Richard Cizik, head of the National Association of Evangelicals, “We
[evangelicals] haven’t had this kind of success on the international front ever before that we’re
having today (quoted in Stockman 2004).” Writing in the National Journal, Alexis Simendinger,
an associate at the Hudson Institute, concurred, concluding that “the influence of the religious
right has never been more robust on foreign policy” (Simendinger 2001).
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