The lower reliance on emotional cues in a higher information environment also extended
to the less significant impact of enemy images in forging policy preferences on the war in Iraq.
Feelings toward Iran, a neighboring nation to Iraq identified as a sponsor of terrorism and a
member of the infamous ‘axis of evil,’ served as a proxy for enemy image perception. Our
students highly negative feelings toward Iran didn’t change from September-December 2003 but
the utilization of this enemy image became less significant as political knowledge levels
increased for the UK and US students.
Moreover, as the significance of symbolic predisposition was less in a fuller information
environment, the influence of foreign policy preference and political knowledge increased in our
students’ Iraq policy judgment. While studies find lower informed citizens to exhibit less
consistent and more disorganized policy preferences, more informed citizens tend to possess
higher levels of constraint among related policy preferences (Converse, 1964; Jennings, 1992;
Sulfaro, 1996). Similarly, as political information increased for our students, the significance of
the relationship between defense spending preferences and Iraq policy also increased. The
students appeared to be making more consistent and informed linkages between related policy
preferences when possessing fuller relevant political information. Interestingly, despite the
consistent linkages drawn by the Blair and Bush leadership between the threat of terrorism and
the rationale for war in Iraq, our students’ concern with potential terrorist attacks on the UK and
US did not influence their policy preferences on Iraq. Indeed, there had been an increasingly
vociferous skepticism expressed by more visible political opposition disseminated via the UK
and US media disputing any purported link drawn between Saddam Hussein and the type of
terrorist threat associated with al Qaeda and the September 11
th
attacks.
17
Convention