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IV. Conclusion
One central element of US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has been
containing and pursuing the end of authoritarian regimes. Our research indicates that the success
of US policy is likely to vary by the infrastructural institutions of an authoritarian regime. Instead
of focusing on how many elites are the principal decision-makers, the critical difference among
authoritarian regimes is what institutions allow them to sustain their control over their populace.
Leaders of party-based regimes should be better able to retain their tenure than their military
counterparts because of the greater ruling capacity provided by political institutions. This should
also insulate party leaders from the effects of international conflict on leadership tenure.
Conversely, the lack of strong institutions to provide control over society should prompt military
leaders to see conflict as a potential tool to mobilize the populace and prevent elite divisions.
However, this makes the political fortunes of military leaders dependent on the outcome of a
conflict.
We analyze this argument by looking at all leaders from 1919-1995 and find general
support for our argument. First, authoritarian leaders who rely on party institutions initially face
a higher likelihood of removal, although this effect changes the longer the leader stays in power.
After three years in office, a party-based leader is likely to have a greater propensity for survival
in office than his military counterparts. This comports with our general argument that while
military leaders may be able to effectively use repression to maintain their rule in the short term,
the long term ability of party based institutions to maintain societal control leads party based
governments to have longer tenures once they have been in office a few years. Second, the fate
of military leaders is influenced primarily by losses and defeats, but not draws in a war; and
draws but not wins or loses in a crisis. Finally, party based leaders are not affected by the