1
Introduction
The structure of presidential systems places presidents and their political parties in a
peculiar relation of dependence and confrontation (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Shugart,
1998). These actors’ fates are interrelated; their interests, however, are not always aligned.
Executives require their parties’ consent to change the status quo.
2
During their term in
office, they require their parties’ collaboration to approve policies in the legislature,
3
to bridge
their proposals to interest groups outside of the legislature (Corrales, 2002; Murillo, 2000),
and, if allowed, to run for reelection. Even if presidents can unilaterally achieve their ends, for
example, using executives’ decree authority, their parties can retaliate in future interactions
by hurting executives’ interests (Carey and Shugart, 1998). In addition, executives’
dependence on their parties continues once presidents’ terms are over. From that time on,
they need their parties’ aid to keep their preferred policies intact and sometimes to stay out of
jail.
Ruling parties
4
also need their presidents to achieve their goals. Party members
significantly depend on their executives to be reelected and to implement their policy
preferences. Voting research shows that an incumbent party’s reelection relies heavily on
retrospective assessments of presidents’ performance (Lewis-Beck et al., 2000; Magaloni,
1994; Remmer, 1991). Parties also require their presidents’ help to access many material
resources over which presidents have exclusive access, such as particularistic spending
(e.g. Alesina et al., 1997; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2005) and cabinet and bureaucratic posts (e.g.
Geddes, 1994).
2
This is a necessary, although not always sufficient, condition.
3
Even if presidents’ parties do not have the legislative majority, they are usually within the minimal wining
coalition.
4
By ruling parties I mean the executive’s party, regardless of whether it holds the majority of the legislature or not.
Convention