3
cheaper as compared to a divided government setting,
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this does not imply that getting their
parties’ help should be costless for presidents.
In this paper, I develop a game theoretic approach that explains the circumstances under
which presidents are able to get their parties’ support to modify the status quo. I think of the
relationship of these two actors as a bargaining problem between two subjects whose fates
are interdependent but who have difficulties coordinating their choices in intertemporal
exchange, which can be either voluntary or coercive.
Two main insights are derived from this framework: First, a ruling party’s endorsement of
its executive is not always costless or uninterested, as in “persuasion” theories (e.g.
Corrales, 2002; Neustadt, 1990), but in many cases presidents have to compensate their
parties’ support. Second, a president’s decision compensate his party is prospective; that is,
the mere fact that a party helped an individual to reach presidential office does not imply that
he will pay it back with support. Reciprocation depends on how costly it is for an executive to
do so, in terms of the action that the party requires, how much support the party can offer,
and the means of enforcement that the party possesses to coerce its president to behave.
This paper unfolds as follows. I first show that the relationship of presidents and their
parties is not frictionless. Their interests diverge in many settings and they have problems
trusting each other. I then provide a game theoretic explanation about the specific
circum stances under which we should expect that presidents get the support of their parties.
I illustrate each of the game’s equilibriums with brief narratives. I conclude by summarizing
this paper’s main findings.
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Nevertheless, there is debate about whether policy-making under divided government actually differs from
united government settings. See, for example, Alt and Lowry (1994), Coleman (1999), Fiorina (1994), and
Mayhew (1991).
Convention