Citation

A Matter of Trust: Cognition, Institutions, and the Sources of Credible Commitment

Abstract | Word Stems | Keywords | Association | Citation | Get this Document | Similar Titles




STOP!

You can now view the document associated with this citation by clicking on the "View Document as HTML" link below.

View Document as HTML:
Click here to view the document

Abstract:

A large and growing literature has focused attention on the broad problem of commitment in political life. Typically, the conditions that make commitments credible are viewed as a matter of structure: of whether institutions are configured in ways that bind the hands of current and future actors. In this paper, I argue that the credibility of commitments should instead be theorized as a matter of perception – as an instance of the broader problem of how actors make judgments under uncertainty. The paper makes a case for grounding the analysis of credibility in a cognitively plausible model of how decision-makers process information and form assessments of risk. Borrowing from literatures on ideas in politics and on cognition, I theorize that perceptions of credibility are substantially shaped by the frames and historical experiences readily available to political actors in a given context. The paper tests the plausibility of this framework through an analysis of multiple episodes of pension policy making in Germany and the United States.

Most Common Document Word Stems:

credibl (51), commit (50), institut (43), polit (40), actor (31), problem (30), make (28), polici (24), govern (23), futur (19), structur (19), term (17), cognit (16), literatur (15), constrain (12), bargain (12), one (11), long (11), weingast (10), uncertainti (10), north (10),

Author's Keywords:

credible commitment, institutions, cognition, availability, ideas, uncertainty, heuristics, attention
Convention
Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events!
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

Association:
Name: American Political Science Association
URL:
http://www.apsanet.org


Citation:
URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40393_index.html
Direct Link:
HTML Code:

MLA Citation:

Jacobs, Alan. "A Matter of Trust: Cognition, Institutions, and the Sources of Credible Commitment" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2011-03-14 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40393_index.html>

APA Citation:

Jacobs, A. M. , 2005-09-01 "A Matter of Trust: Cognition, Institutions, and the Sources of Credible Commitment" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-14 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40393_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: A large and growing literature has focused attention on the broad problem of commitment in political life. Typically, the conditions that make commitments credible are viewed as a matter of structure: of whether institutions are configured in ways that bind the hands of current and future actors. In this paper, I argue that the credibility of commitments should instead be theorized as a matter of perception – as an instance of the broader problem of how actors make judgments under uncertainty. The paper makes a case for grounding the analysis of credibility in a cognitively plausible model of how decision-makers process information and form assessments of risk. Borrowing from literatures on ideas in politics and on cognition, I theorize that perceptions of credibility are substantially shaped by the frames and historical experiences readily available to political actors in a given context. The paper tests the plausibility of this framework through an analysis of multiple episodes of pension policy making in Germany and the United States.

Get this Document:

Find this citation or document at one or all of these locations below. The links below may have the citation or the entire document for free or you may purchase access to the document. Clicking on these links will change the site you're on and empty your shopping cart.

Abstract Only All Academic Inc.
Associated Document Available American Political Science Association
Associated Document Available Political Research Online

Document Type: application/pdf
Page count: 55
Word count: 3713
Text sample:
A Matter of Trust: Cognition Institutions and the Sources of Credible Commitment Alan M. Jacobs Assistant Professor Department of Political Science University of British Columbia C472 -- 1866 Main Mall Vancouver B.C. V6T 1Z1 jacobs@politics.ubc.ca PRELIMINARY DRAFT: DO NOT CITE Abstract A large and growing literature has focused attention on the broad problem of commitment in political life. Typically the conditions that make commitments credible are viewed as a matter of structure: of whether institutions are configured in ways
to the multi­valence of many institutional arrangements. Even at best where we can safely attribute average tendencies to particular institutional setups there will be wide variation in outcomes across specific policy sectors national contexts and time periods. Consider the case of an actor deciding whether to assent to a policy bargain that is costly in the short term and has value only if the policy agreed to today remains stable over the long term. Suppose further that there exists


Similar Titles:
Climate Change as a Long-term Policy Challenge: Three Commitment Problems

The Political Economy of Long-Term Policy Problems

When Can Governments Invest?: Institutions, Government Capacities, and Policies for the Long Term


 
All Academic, Inc. is your premier source for research and conference management. Visit our website, www.allacademic.com, to see how we can help you today.