most extreme point on the response set).
For ease of communication, I will refer to these as national
identities, racial identities, and ethnic identities, even though I do not ascribe much substance to the words
“racial” and “ethnic.”
Gibson (2004b) found that, in the South African case, those who identify with relatively narrow
ethnic/linguistic groups, and who believe strongly in the need for group solidarity, are more likely to be
intolerant of their political foes. Those identifying with large, heterogenous groups are not particularly
intolerant, even when they believe strongly in the need for group solidarity.
Thus, in the case of political
tolerance, these identities moderate the connection between ingroup sympathy and outgroup antipathy.
Is squatting a context that activates “identity-relevant concerns?” The “identity-threat hypothesis”
states that “people should devote more thought and analysis to whether an encounter was fair or unfair if
the encounter threatens rather than affirms the perceiver’s currently activated identity and associated
goals and values” (Skitka 2003, 287).
In the case of these justice judgments, perhaps the existence of a
superordinate identity (identifying with the nation) makes black South Africans more sensitive to the
preferences of their white fellow citizens, and therefore more likely to be influenced by the need of the
landowner. As González and Brown assert (2003, 211), encouraging dual-identities may be an effective
“strategy for promoting generalization of positive intergroup attitudes where minorities and majorities co-
exist.” Moreover, perhaps a connection exists between national identities and emphasis on procedural
justice as a universalistic norm. The belief that everyone is connected by virtue of being South African
imbues all citizens with rights, including the right to be treated with dignity, even while being evicted
from an unlawful land grab.
It is more difficult to derive hypotheses to distinguish the justice judgments
0Across the three types of identities, tiny and insignificant differences exist in the ascribed importance of
the identity, with the range being from 91 % among those asserting a national identity to 86 % among
those claiming an ethnic identity.
0This similar to Posner’s (2004) finding in Zambia. Posner’s analysis is particularly relevant because he
posits that intergroup differences are neutralized in Zambia by the creation of a salient superordinate
identity: Both Chewas and Tumbukas apparently think of themselves as “Easterners.”
0A battery of identity questions was asked prior to the vignette, so identities were primed or to some
degree activated when the respondents were asked to make the justice judgements.
0Miller (1999, 101) recognizes dignity as a criterion by which the procedural justice of a situation is
judged: “Thus we can say that a fair procedure is one that does not require people to behave in
undignified ways or to have things done to them that would normally be thought of as offensive or
degrading.” All of these are elements of respect: “It is disrespectful of people not to give equal attention
to their claims, not to attempt to gain an accurate picture of their circumstances, not to explain the reasons
Convention