Pierre F. Landry: Decentralization and Regime Transformation
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likely to be more receptive to the idea, particularly if decentralization breeds desirable
outcomes. Short-term interests may push leaders to decentralize if the they expect that the
resultant economic growth will bolster popular support. Good local governance may also
help reduce corruption, thus increase the legitimacy of the regime. Decentralization also
presents an opportunity to build alliances with regional leaders, and give them a political
stake in the regime. It may even reduce the fiscal burden of the central government.
For authoritarian leaders, problems arise if they expect that these side benefits of
decentralization facilitate democratization. They may also fear indirect effects:
decentralization may be conducive to improved economic well-being, but if economic
well-being in turn undermines autocracy, authoritarian regimes are likely to oppose
decentralization. It is therefore useful to understand why—and the specific conditions
under which—authoritarian rulers adopt decentralization policies.
I do so in three steps. I first discuss the problems of measuring decentralization in
cross-section time-series data. The second part of the paper explores the question “who
decentralizes?” and addresses the empirical question of the propensity of authoritarian
rulers to decentralize. In the third section explores how the economic and political
consequences of decentralization interact: does decentralization favor growth, but doe
growth in turn undermines autocracies, controlling for their degree of economic and
political decentralization?
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