Author's Keywords: Legislative structures, parliamentary committees, electoral system design, coalition government	Convention Submission, Review, and Scheduling! All Academic Convention can help with all of your abstract management needs and many more. Contact us today for a quote! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40478_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Martin, Shane. "Parliamentary Committees, Agency-Drift and Legislators' Preferences in Comparative Perspective" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2011-03-14 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40478_index.html>

Martin, S. , 2005-09-01 "Parliamentary Committees, Agency-Drift and Legislators' Preferences in Comparative Perspective" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-14 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40478_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Although committees constitute one of the most significant and well-researched forms of internal legislative organization little is known about the nature and causes of variation in committee structures across different legislatures. I suggest that strong committees emerge in parliamentary systems of government as a structural solution to the need of parties in coalition government to monitor the behavior of individual cabinet ministers. Further, I argue that, under parliamentarism, a strong committee system is more likely to emerge where the design of the electoral system creates little incentive for incumbents to cultivate a personal vote. I test these propositions against alternative explanations of institutional design using new data on committee structures in 31 democratic assemblies. The evidence suggests that parties in multiparty government use parliamentary committees to manage and monitor the implementation of coalition policy. Electoral rules and alternative accounts of institutional design prove less useful as explanations of strong committees.

The Policy Assertiveness of Political Parties in Coalition Governments

Legislative Process, Party System and Coalition Government Formation