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ideal policy point differs from that of coalition policy. Certainly it may be the case that a
legislator from the same party as a minister may be disinterested in keep tabs on that minister.
In reality, oversight would most likely come from legislators from the other party or parties in
government and from opposition legislators who would probably want to create tension
between coalition partners by highlighting any difference between ministerial policy and
coalition policy. Recall also that coalition policy is assumed to be a compromise between the
ideal points of each party in government. The task of member A from party A when
overseeing minister B from party B is to get minister B to compromise from B’s ideal point,
towards A’s – critically this has the practical effect of dragging minister B towards coalition
policy and A’s ideal point at the same time. In other words, when a legislator from a party in
government is overseeing a minister from a different political party, seeking to have the
minister implement coalition policy has the effect of moving the ministers policy both closer
to coalition policy and the legislators ideal point. It would be impractical for a legislator from
a governing party to attempt to get a minister from that government to move beyond coalition
policy, given that coalition policy was agreed by all parties in government.
Finally, it is worth exploring how different the relationship between electoral systems
and committee structures is likely to be under presidentialism. The incentive structure facing
legislators in presidential systems may be very different even with the same electoral rules, in
large part due to the ability of legislators to take credit for policy changes under
presidentialism (Ferejohn 1974). In the United States Congress, for example, committees
provide an opportunity for members to cultivate a personal vote by distributing particularistic
benefits to constituents. Individual legislators succeed in claiming credit for policy change.
Where committees provide such opportunities for reputation-building with constituents, and
the electoral system is candidate-centered, legislators will have an incentive to participate in
Convention