Why Committees?
Multiparty Ministerial Government and Legislators Preferences in
Comparative Perspective
Abstract: Although committees constitute one of the most significant and well-researched
forms of internal legislative organization little is known about the nature and causes of
variation in committee structures across different legislatures. I suggest that strong
committees emerge in parliamentary systems of government as a structural solution to the
need of parties in coalition government to monitor the behavior of individual cabinet
ministers. Further, I argue that, under parliamentarism, a strong committee system is more
likely to emerge where the design of the electoral system creates little incentive for
incumbents to cultivate a personal vote. I test these propositions against alternative
explanations of institutional design using new data on committee structures in 31 democratic
assemblies. The evidence suggests that parties in multiparty government use parliamentary
committees to manage and monitor the implementation of coalition policy. Electoral rules and
alternative accounts of institutional design prove less useful as explanations of strong
committees.
Convention