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Economic Inequality, Redistribution and Political Inequality
Unformatted Document Text:  INCOME INEQUALITY AND TURNOUT INEQUALITY IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES Christopher J. Anderson ## email not listed ## Pablo Beramendi ## email not listed ## Maxwell School Syracuse University Abstract We examine the link between income inequality and electoral turnout. We argue that the competition among political parties as well as the interplay between political parties and voters can be characterized as prisoner’s dilemmas. Following on this, we develop a theory, which predicts that countries will be characterized by one of two stable equilibria: Countries where low income individuals feel represented by political parties, are mobilized by parties, and turn out to vote; and, conversely, countries where low income individuals are not mobilized by parties and fail to vote. Based on individual level data from Sweden and the United States as well as macro-level data collected in 13 OECD democracies, we find evidence consistent with our hypotheses. *** Work in Progress – Comments Welcome *** Acknowledgments: We are grateful to Mikki Caul Kittilson, Michael McDonald and Lyle Scruggs for help with obtaining some of the data. The survey data are available as ICPSR Studies No. 2683 and 3808. We are also grateful to the participants in the Conference “Democracy, Inequality and Representation: Europe in Comparative Perspective” (May 5-7 2005, Syracuse University), and in particular Michael McDonald, for their very helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C. September 1-4 2005.

Authors: Anderson, Christopher. and Beramendi, Pablo.
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INCOME INEQUALITY AND TURNOUT INEQUALITY IN ADVANCED
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES
Christopher J. Anderson
## email not listed ##
Pablo Beramendi
## email not listed ##
Maxwell School
Syracuse University
Abstract
We examine the link between income inequality and electoral turnout. We argue that the
competition among political parties as well as the interplay between political parties and
voters can be characterized as prisoner’s dilemmas. Following on this, we develop a
theory, which predicts that countries will be characterized by one of two stable equilibria:
Countries where low income individuals feel represented by political parties, are
mobilized by parties, and turn out to vote; and, conversely, countries where low income
individuals are not mobilized by parties and fail to vote. Based on individual level data
from Sweden and the United States as well as macro-level data collected in 13 OECD
democracies, we find evidence consistent with our hypotheses.
*** Work in Progress – Comments Welcome ***
Acknowledgments: We are grateful to Mikki Caul Kittilson, Michael McDonald and Lyle Scruggs for help with
obtaining some of the data. The survey data are available as ICPSR Studies No. 2683 and 3808. We are also
grateful to the participants in the Conference “Democracy, Inequality and Representation: Europe in
Comparative Perspective” (May 5-7 2005, Syracuse University), and in particular Michael McDonald, for their
very helpful comments on a previous version of this paper.


Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Washington D.C. September 1-4 2005.


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