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Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the relationship between income inequality and electoral
turnout. To understand this relationship, we argue, it is useful to think of the interplay
between voters and parties as a set of intertwined prisoner’s dilemmas. We have argued
that the incentives to cooperate both between voters and parties and among parties
themselves are directly related to the spread of the income distribution. We have also
shown that the interaction between parties and voters is likely to yield either a high
inequality, low turnout or a low turnout, high inequality equilibrium. Using both
aggregate data on OECD elections between 1980 and 2002 and individual data from the
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems we have provided empirical support for our
claims.
By illuminating the link between inequality and turnout, the paper also points to
several areas for further research. The sustainability of the two equilibria indicated above
is anchored in a number of institutional differences that concern both the design of the
electoral system and the functioning of different systems of social protections (Pontusson
2005). As highlighted by a cumulative body of political economy literature (Beramendi
and Cusack 2004, Iversen and Soskice 2005, Pontusson 2005), these are the nuts and
bolts behind different levels of inequality. For instance, the low inequality, high turnout
equilibrium is anchored on an institutionalized exchange between parties and voters. At
the core of such exchange is the welfare state, or if preferred, the institutionalization of
high levels of decommodification (Esping-Andersen 1990; Scruggs and Allan 2003). The
comparative analysis of electoral turnout has much to gain from a more detailed
Convention