8
While both theories seem feasible, there is qualitative evidence that the viability
theory is correct. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Scottish National Party
adopted a policy of independence in Europe in the 1980s, precisely because the EU
allowed for political autonomy without fear of economic dislocation (Lynch 1996, 38).
Similarly, in 1989, the Plaid Cymru supported a policy of independence in the EU while
encouraging the EU to evolve into a true Europe of the regions (Lynch 1996, 76). Across
Europe, Kurzer found that regional politicians are generally enthusiastic about a federal
Europe (1997, 43).
Nevertheless, it is important to understand whether variation within the regionalist
party family occurs and whether this variation is territorial, temporal, or issue-based. As
the EU evolves from simply the 'negative integration' of opening markets to the potential
'positive integration' of social and welfare policy (Scharpf 1996, 15), party families may
switch from being more or less supportive of the European project. For instance, social
democratic parties have become more supportive of European integration as the agenda
has turned from simply market integration to 'regulated capitalism' while right-wing
parties have gone in the opposite direction (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004, 129). It
could be that some regional groups supported a form of “independence in Europe” as
long as the integration was mainly economic in nature, yielding economic benefits
without threats to political sovereignty, but when economic integration completed and the
attention turned to political matters, the groups perceived a greater threat. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 may both be valid in different contexts.
Observationally, these two causal mechanisms, viability and fear, are equivalent
in terms of predicting greater electoral support for regional political parties as European
Convention