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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40587_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Whang, Taehee. "Unifying Theory and Testing of Economic Sanctions Outcomes" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2011-03-14 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40587_index.html>

Whang, T. , 2005-09-01 "Unifying Theory and Testing of Economic Sanctions Outcomes" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2011-03-14 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p40587_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: When should we expect economic sanctions to succeed? Previous studies predict that sanctions will be more effective when the issue at stake is important, the sender and target are allied, the target's domestic institutions are more democratized, and the target's economy is more dependent on the sender. I subject these hypotheses to empirical testing using a fully structural estimation that employs a game theoretic model as a statistical model. The theoretical model formalizes a simple crisis bargaining logic with two-sided incomplete information. Findings suggest that the issue salience is positively associated with sanctions' imposition, but not necessarily with sanctions' effectiveness. Moreover, the allied targets tend to comply even when they can win the sanction contest, while the non-allied targets tend to resist when the sender credibly signals that she would continue the sanctions unless the target complies. Finally, I examine these estimated results with four case studies: US vs. South Korea (1973-1977), US vs. Nicaragua (1977-1979), Britain-US vs. Iran (1951-1953), and US vs. Ethiopia (1977-1992).

Taking Comparative Advantage Seriously: Sender-Target Trade Relationship and Success of Economic Sanctions

Assessing Sanctions Outcomes: Asymmetric Perceptions, Issue Salience, and Economic Sanctions