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Unifying Theory and Testing of Economic Sanctions Outcomes
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Unifying Theory and Testing of Economic
Sanctions Outcomes
Taehee Whang
Department of Political Science
University of Rochester
Rochester, NY 14627
## email not listed ##
Prepared for the 2005 APSA Annual Meeting.
Abstract
When should we expect economic sanctions to succeed? Previous studies pre-
dict that sanctions will be more e¤ective when the issue at stake is important, thesender and target are allied, the target’s domestic institutions are more democra-tized, and the target’s economy is more dependent on the sender. I subject thesehypotheses to empirical testing using a fully structural estimation that employsa game theoretic model as a statistical model. The theoretical model formalizesa simple crisis bargaining logic with two-sided incomplete information. Findingssuggest that the issue salience is positively associated with sanctions’imposition,but not necessarily with sanctions’e¤ectiveness. Moreover, the allied targets tendto comply even when they can win the sanction contest, while the non-allied tar-gets tend to resist when the sender credibly signals that she would continue thesanctions unless the target complies. Finally, I examine these estimated resultswith four case studies: US vs. South Korea (1973-1977), US vs. Nicaragua (1977-1979), Britain-US vs. Iran (1951-1953), and US vs. Ethiopia (1977-1992).
For comments and suggestions, I thank Susan Allen, Seokju Cho, Hein Goemans, Mark Fey,Kyungwon Seo, Curt Signorino, Jessica Stoll, Randy Stone, Amy Yuen, and participants ofthe 2005 EITM Summer Institute. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2005Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Watson Seminar at Universityof Rochester, and the 2005 EITM Summer Institute.
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Unifying Theory and Testing of Economic
Sanctions Outcomes
Taehee Whang
Department of Political Science
University of Rochester
Rochester, NY 14627
## email not listed ##
Prepared for the 2005 APSA Annual Meeting.
Abstract
When should we expect economic sanctions to succeed? Previous studies pre-
dict that sanctions will be more e¤ective when the issue at stake is important, the
sender and target are allied, the target’s domestic institutions are more democra-
tized, and the target’s economy is more dependent on the sender. I subject these
hypotheses to empirical testing using a fully structural estimation that employs
a game theoretic model as a statistical model. The theoretical model formalizes
a simple crisis bargaining logic with two-sided incomplete information. Findings
suggest that the issue salience is positively associated with sanctions’imposition,
but not necessarily with sanctions’e¤ectiveness. Moreover, the allied targets tend
to comply even when they can win the sanction contest, while the non-allied tar-
gets tend to resist when the sender credibly signals that she would continue the
sanctions unless the target complies. Finally, I examine these estimated results
with four case studies: US vs. South Korea (1973-1977), US vs. Nicaragua (1977-
1979), Britain-US vs. Iran (1951-1953), and US vs. Ethiopia (1977-1992).
For comments and suggestions, I thank Susan Allen, Seokju Cho, Hein Goemans, Mark Fey,
Kyungwon Seo, Curt Signorino, Jessica Stoll, Randy Stone, Amy Yuen, and participants of
the 2005 EITM Summer Institute. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2005
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Watson Seminar at University
of Rochester, and the 2005 EITM Summer Institute.
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