Contents
1
Questions
1
2
Plausible Explanations
4
3
The Model
7
4
Empirical Analysis
9
4.1
Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
4.2
Data, Variables, and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.4
Issue Salience, Target’s Domestic institutions, and Trade Dependence
. 19
4.5
Dyadic relationship: Inconsistency between the intuition of the model
and sanctions data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5
Case Analysis
28
5.1
US vs. South Korea (1973 –1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.2
US vs. Nicaragua (1977 –1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.3
Britain and US vs. Iran (1951-1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.4
US vs. Ethiopia (1976-1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6
Conclusion
39
1