people felt that their power was waning rapidly after the end of WWII. Consequently,
the British position was …rmly resolved in this case and it was unlikely that Eden
would have backed down from the blockade.
Later, when the US joined the sanctions with Britain in July 1953, Eisenhower
demonstrated his willingness by publicly disclosing the secret letter he had received
from Mussadegh. He publicly announced that he opposed to the nationalization and
would withhold aid that Mussadegh had requested. Even the title of New York Times
article was ‘Eisenhower is …rm in barring Iran aid (July 10 1953)’. This commitment
e¤ectively showed that the US would stand …rm if Iran resisted the demands of revoking
the expropriation.
In sum, Britain-US sanctions were successful in the sense that the appropriation
of AIOC was revoked and Mussadegh was destabilized. Like in the Nicaraguan case,
however, credible sanctions by Britain and the US were not the only determinant
that led to compliance. Although this coup was a direct cause of the removal of
Mussadegh, sanctions clearly contributed to the outcome. Not only was the British
blockade e¤ective in pressuring for negotiation, but the US decision to participate
in sanctions also played a decisive role in concluding the episode. Unlike the next
Ethiopian case where the US failed in a coup attempt, well-coordinated joint sanctions
created favorable conditions by increasing Mussadegh’s vulnerability to the coup.
5.4
US vs. Ethiopia (1976-1992)
In September 1974, the Derg, a military committee composed of junior o¢ cers, deposed
Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie. General Aman Mikael Andom, a pro-US Eritrean,
became the chair of the Provisional Military Administrative Control (PMAC) but
his proposal to compromise with Eritrea, which had been in a civil war with Ethiopia
since 1962, caused a military coup in November 1974. A young o¢ cer, Mengistu Haile-
Mariam, a hardline communist, seized control. During this process, mass slaughter and
executions occurred, and the Chicago Tribune wrote that ‘if the old regime of Emperor
was corrupt, Ethiopia’s ruling military council has shown after some months that the
new regime is murderous beyond belief’(Korn 1986, 12). Moreover, the PMAC began
to nationalize institutions and properties under a nationalistic slogan ‘Ethiopia Tik-
dem’, which later came to represent Ethiopian socialism. From January to July 1975, it
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Convention