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Unifying Theory and Testing of Economic Sanctions Outcomes
Unformatted Document Text:  [18] Eland, Ivan. 1995. “Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Foreign Policy”. in Cor- tright, David and Lopez, George A. 2002. Smart Sanctions: Targeting EconomicStatecraft. Lanham: Rowman and Little Field [19] Elliott, Kimberly Ann. 1998. “The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?” International Security 23 (1) [20] Fearon, James. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests" Journal of Con‡ict Resolution 41 (1997):68-90. [21] Fearon, James. "Signaling versus Balance of Power and Interests" Journal of Con- ‡ict Resolution 38 (1994), pp. 236-69. [22] Goode, James F. 1997. The United States and Iran The St.Martin’s Press [23] Hart, Robert A. 2000. “Democracy and the Successful Use of Economic Sanctions” Political Research Quarterly 53 (2) [24] Hufbauer, Elliott, Cyrus, and Winston. 1997 “US Economic Sanctions: Their Impact on Trade, Jobs, and Wages” Working Paper Institute for InternationalEconomics [25] Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott. 1990. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. The In- stitute for International Economics [26] Hufbauer and Elliott. 1999 “Same Song, Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in the 1990’s” American Economic Review 89 (2) [27] Hufbauer and Oegg. 2003 “The Impact of Economic Sanctions on US Trade” International Economics Policy Briefs [28] Judkins, Benjamin. 2003. “Economic Statecraft and Regime Type: Transparency, Credibility, and Con‡ict Resolution” in Annual Meeting of International StudiesAssociation 387-404. [29] Kaempfer, William and Lowenberg, Anton. 1992. International Economic Sanc- tions. The Westview Press [30] Korn, David A. 1986. Ethiopia, The United States, and The Soviet Union The Southern Illinois University Press [31] Lacy, Dean and Niou, Emerson M. S. 2004. “A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats” Journalof Politics 66 (1) [32] Lefebvre, Je¤rey A. 1991. Arms and The Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1953-1991 The University of Pittsburgh Press [33] Lewis, Je¤rey and Schultz, Kenneth 2003. “Revealing preference: Empirical Esti- mation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information”Political Analy-sis 11:345-367 [34] Marinov, Nikolay. 2005. “Does Pressure from the Outside Destabilize Leaders on the Inside?” American Journal of Political Science. 47

Authors: Whang, Taehee.
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[18] Eland, Ivan. 1995. “Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Foreign Policy”. in Cor-
tright, David and Lopez, George A. 2002. Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic
Statecraft. Lanham: Rowman and Little Field
[19] Elliott, Kimberly Ann. 1998. “The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely
Empty?” International Security 23 (1)
[20] Fearon, James. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests" Journal of Con‡ict Resolution
41 (1997):68-90.
[21] Fearon, James. "Signaling versus Balance of Power and Interests" Journal of Con-
‡ict Resolution 38 (1994), pp. 236-69.
[22] Goode, James F. 1997. The United States and Iran The St.Martin’s Press
[23] Hart, Robert A. 2000. “Democracy and the Successful Use of Economic Sanctions”
Political Research Quarterly 53 (2)
[24] Hufbauer, Elliott, Cyrus, and Winston. 1997 “US Economic Sanctions: Their
Impact on Trade, Jobs, and Wages” Working Paper Institute for International
Economics
[25] Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott. 1990. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. The In-
stitute for International Economics
[26] Hufbauer and Elliott. 1999 “Same Song, Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in
the 1990’s” American Economic Review 89 (2)
[27] Hufbauer and Oegg. 2003 “The Impact of Economic Sanctions on US Trade”
International Economics Policy Briefs
[28] Judkins, Benjamin. 2003. “Economic Statecraft and Regime Type: Transparency,
Credibility, and Con‡ict Resolution” in Annual Meeting of International Studies
Association 387-404.
[29] Kaempfer, William and Lowenberg, Anton. 1992. International Economic Sanc-
tions. The Westview Press
[30] Korn, David A. 1986. Ethiopia, The United States, and The Soviet Union The
Southern Illinois University Press
[31] Lacy, Dean and Niou, Emerson M. S. 2004. “A Theory of Economic Sanctions
and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats” Journal
of Politics 66 (1)
[32] Lefebvre, Je¤rey A. 1991. Arms and The Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia
and Somalia 1953-1991 The University of Pittsburgh Press
[33] Lewis, Je¤rey and Schultz, Kenneth 2003. “Revealing preference: Empirical Esti-
mation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information”Political Analy-
sis 11:345-367
[34] Marinov, Nikolay. 2005. “Does Pressure from the Outside Destabilize Leaders on
the Inside?” American Journal of Political Science.
47


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