comparison between the Czech Republic and Romania is useful because, in the period covered in
this study, only the former received the reward of NATO membership. Moreover, in light of the
lessons learned in the process of incorporating the first wave of newcomers, NATO changed its policy vis-à-
vis second-wave candidates. In the case of the three countries admitted in 1999, the promise of membership
preceded the completion of many of the reforms prescribed by the alliance. Subsequently, the allies
established the Membership Action Plan aimed at promoting change and assessing the candidates’ records
prior to inviting them to join NATO. Consequently, second-wave countries faced the dilemma of having to
carry out comprehensive reforms, and to adopt a series of costly courses of action ( for example, support for
NATO wars abroad) without any guarantee that they would receive the reward of membership.
Nevertheless, NATO carried out similar socialization practices in the Czech Republic and Romania and,
despite the differences in the structure of rewards, those practices did have a powerful impact on both
countries.
The analysis proceeds as follows.
In the next section,
I briefly place my argument within a
broader theoretical framework In the second section, I provide an explanation of relevant
mechanisms of socialization and anticipated scope conditions. I then turn in the third section to the
empirical story--NATO’s socialization of Czech and Romanian actors. Here I examine examples of
teaching and persuasion that occurred in different contexts, and targeted diverse sets of socializees.
The fourth section analyzes the effects of socialization, and the fifth section revisits the question of
scope conditions in light of the preceding empirical analysis.
Theoretical Framework
In recent years, several analysts have argued that NATO is more than just a military alliance.
For instance, neoliberal institutionalists--most famously, Keohane and Wallander--have argued that
there is a difference between alliances, defined as exclusive coalitions that respond to threats, and
security management institutions, which are designed to address a variety of risks.
From this
perspective, NATO is a security management institution, which has always sought to deal not only
with external threats, but also with problems of mistrust and misunderstandings among its members.
The institutionalist argument is that, in the context of the post-1989 shift in security priorities away
from the containment of the Soviet threat, NATO was able to transfer risk management practices
developed during the Cold War to the new situation. Institutionalists argue that, in the instability
characteristic of the early post---Cold War environment, NATO’s experience in cooperation, trust
building, and integration among members was extended into Central/Eastern Europe via the process
of NATO enlargement.
Institutionalists are right to argue that post---Cold War NATO has sought
Kosovo conflict.
2
See Wallander and Keohane 1999; and Wallander 2000.
3
Wallander 2000, 720---21.
2
Convention