often do not, accept their role as students in the process of learning from an authoritative teacher
broad schemes for making sense of the world. They must, however, recognize the other parties as
legitimate partners in a process of (international) communication.
As in the case of teaching, there are interesting differences between constructivist and
rationalist accounts of persuasion. From a rationalist perspective, persuasion is closely related to the
provision of instrumental incentives. For instance, rationalists suggest that the persuader is more
likely to be successful when it can provide significant carrots and/or sticks to the persuadees.
then, would lead us to expect that NATO had a weak influence especially on the Czech Republic,
and particularly after 1997, given that Czechs had reached the conclusion that they would be
included in the first wave of enlargement. Moreover, attempts at persuasion would revolve around
reminders of the sticks/carrots in NATO’s arsenal (particularly the power to withhold/grant
membership), and would involve establishing linkages between reforms and the likelihood of
securing membership in NATO.
From a constructivist perspective, interactions governed by the logic of persuasion involve
different dynamics. Actors that engage in persuasion do not mobilize coercion vis-à-vis their
interlocutors. Similarly, they do not rely on the promise of direct instrumental benefits as a way of
getting subjects to enact prescribed reforms. Rather, actors engaged in persuasion try to present a
given course of action as “the right thing to do” even in the absence of direct international rewards
for taking that action.
The lack of coercion, however, does not mean that no power is involved in
interactions governed by the logic of persuasion. As I mentioned above, such interactions take place
within a socially constructed framework of ideas, which reflect the power of particular actors to
define the “common lifeworld” within which certain arguments are regarded as legitimate, while
others (which violate the established collective interpretations of the world) are not.
Successful socialization would lead the socializees to internalize the new ideas about the
nature and purpose of their polity. This internalization would, I suggest, be revealed by a series of
indicators: the socializees would be consistent in their (re)definition of identity/interest in
accordance to the new ideas, and they would uphold the new definitions vis-à-vis different
audiences and in different circumstances (rather than invoke different definitions to different
audiences, in an attempt to enhance their international gains and minimize domestic costs). In the
case of political elites with decision-making power in the process of postcommunist reconstruction,
it is also reasonable to expect that they would try to protect and promote the definitions they now
take for granted, for instance by seeking to embed them in the institutions, legislation, and practices
of their polity.
25
See Schimmelfennig 2003.
26
On this see Risse 2000; Checkel 2001; and Checkel and Moravcsik 2001. Also relevant is Jupille, Caporaso and
Checkel 2003.
9
Convention