Why do European Union (EU) Member States with reputations for supporting
deeper integration have so much difficulty implementing EU labor policy? Each year,
the European Commission initiates infringement cases against Member States for failure
to implement labor policy. Member States’ responses to these cases vary substantially.
Why did 29 per cent of infringement cases against France for failure to implement labor
policy between 1978 and 2000 reach the European Court of Justice (ECJ) while only 5.8
per cent of cases against Greece went to the ECJ during the same period? Why have 29.2
per cent of cases against Luxembourg ended before the ECJ while only 6.3 per cent of
cases against the Netherlands required ECJ action? Existing analyses of European policy
implementation do not answer these questions. This article addresses these questions by
examining 186 infringement cases and the administrative oversight structures Member
State governments use to ensure proper implementation of labor policy.
I argue that EU labor policy implementation depends on the maintenance of the
chain of command from the Commission through the Member State governments to the
national labor inspectorates. The mechanisms Member State governments use to oversee
national labor inspectorates constrain that chain of command. Oversight mechanisms that
centralize authority in the hands of the Member States’ governments (police patrols)
facilitate resolution of infringement cases. In contrast, national oversight mechanisms
that depend on cooperation between the government and interest groups (fire alarms)
hinder resolution of infringement cases, allowing them to drag on until referred to the
ECJ. I also argue that prolonged political crises disrupt the chain of command. By
dominating the activities of Member State governments, prolonged political crises disrupt
those governments’ efforts to resolve implementation problems.
Convention