Existing Literature
The existing literature has failed to explain uneven implementation because of a
number of omissions. First, many studies have not examined the institutional structures
involved in overseeing implementation in the Member States. Second, much of the
existing analysis of EU implementation concentrates exclusively on referrals to the ECJ.
Finally, studies applying veto players theory to EU policy implementation fail to account
for two central components of veto players theory. None of the studies of veto players
effect on integration account for the ideological component of veto players theory. The
most recent analysis does not account for the possible effects veto players have on
national institutions. In the following section, I discuss these approaches and the ways
they prevent understanding EU policy implementation.
Lack of Focus on Oversight Institutions
A growing body of research recognizes that domestic administrative styles can
disrupt EU policy implementation (Peters 1992; Sbragia 1992; Piotet 1996; Wessels and
Rometsch 1996; Hooghe and Marks 1997; Hueglin 1997; Knill and Lenschow 2000;
Knill 2001; Mbaye 2001; Borzel 2002; Falkner, Hartlapp, Leiber and Treib 2002). This
literature is often referred to as the “multi-level governance” approach. These studies do
not discuss specific institutions; rather they focus on general practices throughout
Member States’ civil services. Much of this research treats administrative structures and
practices as an undifferentiated whole. Furthermore, none of these studies examines the
oversight mechanisms constraining administrative practices in the Member States.
Much of the research following the multi-level governance approach focuses on the
informal links between national civil servants and officials working at the supra-national
level, especially at the Commission. However, while informal contacts can be important,
Convention