the fact remains that the Commission cannot apply any sanction or threat of sanctions
against national civil servants. The infringement process wielded by the Commission
applies only to the Member State governments themselves. Neglecting the formal
institutional relationships, especially the oversight mechanisms used by the Member
States, prevents scholars from developing a complete understanding of the problems
involved in EU policy implementation.
Exclusive Focus on the ECJ
A number of prominent studies of the implementation of EU law have focused
exclusively on referrals to the ECJ (Burley and Mattli 1993; Garret, Kelemen and Schulz
1998; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998; Kilroy 1999; Mbaye 2001). This approach has
produced important findings regarding the incentives facing the ECJ itself (see especially
Garret, Kelemen and Schulz 1998 and Kilroy 1999). However, the approach falls short
when used to explain implementation by Member States (Burley and Mattli 1993; Stone
Sweet and Brunell 1998; Mbaye 2001). Explaining implementation primarily in terms of
the erosion of national sovereignty by the courts (Burley and Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet
and Brunell) ignores important policy changes made without the involvement of either
the ECJ or the national courts. Since EU policies can be transposed by a variety of
methods, such omissions impair our understanding of EU policy implementation.
Incomplete operationalization of veto player effects
A number of students of the European Union have examined the relationship
between national veto players and integration (Martin 1995; Haverland 1999; Mbaye
2001). All of these studies count the number of veto players without accounting for the
ideological distance between those veto players. Furthermore, Mbaye (2001) examines
Convention